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It is estimated that the United States' coal production must at
least double by 1985 if this country hopes to achieve energy
independence.' Fortunately, the United States has a great, untapped
supply of coal. Coal reserves Constitute approximately 857o of this
nation's total energy resources, while coal presently provides only 18%
of the nation's energy.
2
The 1973 oil embargo focused interest on the use of low-sulfur western
coal. Such coal with its low sulfur content has the added environmen-
tal value to midwestern and southern utilities of complying with stringent
federal and state air pollution control standards.' Eighty percent of
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Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Lecturer, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Law School. Member, State Bar of Wisconsin.
** B.A., 1979, Dartmouth; J.D., 1982, Wisconsin. Associate, Folby & Lordner. Former
Project Assistant, School of N4atural Resources and Law School, University of Wisconsin. Member,
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*** B.A., 1978, Simmons; J.D., 1982, Wisconsin. Research Assistant, Office of Legislative
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1. See ENERGY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC., SLURRY PIPELINES-INNOVATION IN ENERGY
TRANSPORTATION 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ETSI REPORT]. ETSI is the leading proponent
of coal slurry pipelines and is the developer of the Wyoming-Arkansas coal slurry pipeline. ETSI
is a partnership composed of Bechtel, a large California engineering firm, Texas Eastern Corp.,
ARCO Pipeline Co., Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas, and Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, a New
York investment banking house.
2. See Leisenring, Western Coal-The Sleeping Giant, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1,
5 (1974). See also ETSI REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
3. ETSI REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. Sulfur content of western coal averages about .5%,
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the country's coal reserves are west of the Mississippi, with the greatest
known deposits in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming." Coal
development is also taking place in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico,
Texas, Utah, and Washington.' The crucial problem is how to get this
western coal to the industrial centers.
Basically, railroads have been the only feasible mode of transpor-
tation available for transporting coal from the sparsely populated
western states to distant urban power plants.6 Two-thirds of the 830
million tons of coal produced in the United States in 1980 was
transported by railroads, and with that amount they carried five times
more than any other transportation mode.7 According to the National
Coal Association, 85% of the coal shipped by rail cannot be transported
practicably by any other means.' Motor carrier transportation is not
economical for long hauls and barge carriage by water is unavailable
in those western states with large coal deposits.9
Rail transportation, however, is expensive. Rail costs are more than
double the cost of the coal itself,"0 and inflation and deregulation are
pushing costs even higher. To increase the attractiveness of marketing
western coal, energy companies are showing an interest in reviving an
old transportation device-the coal slurry pipeline.'
Numerous controversies have arisen in relation to the proposed coal
slurry pipeline. Considerable disagreement exists as to whether coal
slurry pipelines should be abetted by federal and state legislation. Other
concerns include the effect of the pipelines on the cost of coal, the
economic impact on the railroads, the environmental effects of increased
while sulfur content in midwestern and eastern coal averages about 3%. Id. See Leisenring, supra
note 2, at 7.
4. Leisenring, supra note 2, at 5. Montana has nearly 222 billion tons of mostly sub-bituminous
coal; North Dakota has more than 350 billion tons of known reserves of lignite coal; and Wyo-
ming has more than 120 billion tons of sub-bituminous coal. Id.
5. Id. at 6. New Mexico, with 60 billion tons, has the largest mine in the country.
6. HUDsoN INsTruTE, RESEARCH ANALYSIS OF FAcTORS AECTING TRANSPORTAION OF COAL
BY RAIL AND SLURRY PIPELuINS 1 (1976) (prepared under a grant from the Burlington Northern
Railroad) [hereinafter cited as HUDSON REPORT].
7. To Facilitate the Transportation of Coal by Pipeline Across Federal and Nonfederal Lands:
Hearings on H.R. 4230 Before the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 544 (1981) (statement by Carl E. Bagge, President, National Coal Ass'n) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings].
8. Id. at 450, 544.
9. HUrDSON REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
10. Coal Pipeline ,,ct: Hearings on S. 707 and S. 3046 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands
and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 163
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Coal Pipeline Act Hearings].
11. Note, Coal Slurry Pipeline: A Transportation Alternative for North Dakota Coal?, 53
N.D.L. RE,. 449, 450 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note].
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coal utilization, water rights, and water quality.'2 Although coal slurry
pipelines offer an economical alternative to rail transport, the apparent
disadvantage is their need for large amounts of water; the slurry mix-
ture is comprised of approximately equal weights of pulverized coal
and water.'3 Some fear that tremendous demands will be placed on
existing water resources in the semiarid West if a number of the pro-
posed coal slurry pipelines are built throughout the western coal region.
This, according to some, would adversely affect water available for
agriculture, industries, municipalities, and wildlife.' 4 Others argue that
western supplies of low-sulfur coal must be developed to meet current
demands for coal and to comply with federal and state air pollutio.n
control standards. Proponents of coal slurry pipelines emphasize their
economic efficiency by arguing that the expense of transporting western
coal by rail is prohibitive and the construction of massive power plants
to convert coal to electricity at the coal's source would require even
greater amounts of water.'
Because coal slurry pipelines would increase the demand for inter-
state transfers of water, some states are raising jurisdictional barriers
to water exportation as sources of supply become increasingly critical.
Consequently, for the first time questions are being raised as to the
rights of states to preempt the use of water, either directly by legis-
lative proscription on extraterritorial diversions,'6 or indirectly by
narrow definitions of lawful beneficial uses." The basic issue is whether
a state in which the diversion is made can assert dominion over the
water source so as to prohibit its delivery in interstate commerce.'8
Legal controversies over control of the water needed for coal slurry
pipeline transportation and over restrictions on the use of such water
must be resolved. Debate will also intensify over whether the federal
government or the states control western water because much of the
12. Kiechel, Coal Slurry Transportation Systems and Related Water Rights and Water Quali-
ty Problems, 11 NAT. REsouRcEs LAw. 411, 412 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kiechel].
13. ETSI REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
14. Note, supra note 11, at 456; McDaniel, Commerce Clause and Water Availability Issues
Concerning Coal Slurry Pipelines, 12 NAT. REsouRcES LAw. 533, 534 (1979).
15. See generally McDaniel, supra note 14, at 534-35; 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra
note 7, at 163-214 (statement by David A. Skedgell, President and Chief Administrative Officer,
Slurry Transport Ass'n).
16. See, e.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (surface water); id. § 37-90-136
(1973) (groundwater); Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-3-115(b), (c) (1977).
17. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104(2) (1981), providing that the use of water for slurry
transport of. coal is not a beneficial use of water.
18. See Martz & Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and Water Rights-The Slurry Issue,
23 RocKY MTN. Mn4. L. INsT. 33, 33-36 (1977) for further discussion.
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water for slurry pipelines will have to come from federal lands within
the states' boundaries.9
The purpose of this article is to analyze the constitutionality of statutes
prohibiting the interstate transfer of water for coal slurry pipelines.
Emphasis is placed on Colorado's antiexport statute and the proposed
San Marco Pipeline originating in the southeastern part of Colorado.
First, the article describes the development of coal slurry pipelines;
problems and benefits associated with coal slurry pipelines; the San
Marco Pipeline; Colorado water law, including the right to appropriate
water and the administration of water rights; and water ownership and
antiexport statutes. The article next analyzes Colorado's asserted
dominion over water and the constitutionality of antiexport statutes
under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Last,
the article sets forth alternatives to appropriating water under state
statutes, such as federal eminent domain powers, federal reserved water
rights, interstate compacts, and using federal storage water.
I. Development of Coal Slurry Pipelines
Coal slurry pipeline systems consist of seven parts:
(1) a slurry preparation facility;
(2) storage for the slurry before entering the pipeline;
(3) pumping stations to move the slurry through the pipeline;
(4) the pipeline itself;
(5) slurry storage at the destination;
(6) a dewatering plant to separate the coal from the water; and
(7) storage for the dewatered coal.2
0
A slurry is formed by pulverizing the coal2' and then mixing the
pulverized coal with an equal amount of water.22 This slurry mixture
of finely ground coal and water is held in storage tanks equipped with
agitators to prevent settling until introduced into the pipeline by displace-
ment pumps.23 Intermediate booster pump stations located at 50- to
19. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW C6MMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, A REPORT
TO TiE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 141 (1970).
20. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 168. See id. at 169 for a diagram
of the coal slurry pipeline process.
21. See Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 10, at 137 (remarks by W. Pat Jennings,
President, Slurry Transport Ass'n) (coal pulverized to "consistency of sugar"); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF COAL SLURRY PIPELINES
27 (1978) (coal ground to "maximum particle size of one-eighth inch") [hereinafter cited as
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT].
22. Note, supra note 11, at 450; 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note IS, at 168,
169; Webber, Coal Slurry Pipelines are Ready, Willing, and Unable to Get There, I I ST. MARY'S
L.J. 765, 769 (1980).
23. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 27.
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150-mile intervals propel the slurry at a constant velocity of about four
miles per hour to its destination.24 At the terminals the slurry is again
held in agitating tanks until it is centrifuged to separate the coal and
water.25 The dried coal is ready for boiler preparation and the extracted
water can be reused by electric power plants for cooling purposes.26
Even though the technology for transporting granulated coal mixed
with water was patented during the last century,27 it was not really
tested until 1957, when a 108-mile slurry pipeline was opened in Ohio.2"
That pipeline was built in response to high railroad rates but ceased
operation six years later when the railroad reduced rates by 45%.29
Only one coal slurry pipeline is actually operating in the United States
today and that is a 273-mile line from the Peabody Black Mesa Mine,
on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona, to the Southern California
Edison Mohave Power Station on the Colorado River near the southern
tip of Nevada." The Black Mesa Pipeline, which is owned by the
Southern Pacific Railroad, was built in 1970 over terrain too rough
for railroad construction and has used water from the Navajo Indian
Reservation since its inception without any apparent water quality
problems.3
Several other coal slurry pipelines are in varying stages of planning
and development, but all await water allocation, or easements, or both
before construction can begin.3 2 Because conventional coal pipelines
are highly water consumptive, requiring a ton of water to transport
24. Id.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id. See also Note, supra note 11, at 450; Webber, supra note 22, at 769-70. The pulveriz-
ing process and the mixing of the pulverized coal with water also improves the quality of the
coal. When coal is washed its sulfur and ash content is reduced by 15 to 20%. HUDSON REPORT,
supra note 6, at 18.
27. Note, supra note 11, at 451; McDaniel, supra note 14, at 533.
28. ETSI REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2; Note, supra note 11, at 451; Keichel, supra note
12, at 411.
29. ETSI REPORT, supra note 1, at 12; Note, supra note 11, at 451; Kiechel, supra note
12, at 411; Webber, supra note 22, at 766. This pipeline was completed from Cadiz, Ohio, to
Cleveland after the railroad announced a rate increase from $2.63 to $3.47 per ton. The pipeline
was deactivated in 1963 when the railroad developed unit train operations and reduced coal rates
to $1.88 per ton. Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 10, at 152-53.
30. ETSI REPORT, supra note I, at 9; Note, supra note 11, at 451; Kiechel, supra note 12,
at 411; Webber, supra note 22, at 766. See generally Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note
10, at 152-53.
31. HUDSON REPORT, supra note 6, at 9; Note, supra note 11, at 451; Kiechel, supra note
12, at 411.
32. See Note, supra note 11, at 451; TEKNEKRON, INC., DISTRmBmN THE RISKS OF INTER-
BASIN WATER TRANSFERS UNDER DROUGHT CONDITIONS: Tm Dni.EmmA POSED BY COAL SLURRY
PIPELINES, fig. 1-1, at p. 1-2 (1982) (prepared for Office of Water Research and Technology,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior) for maps indicating status of various coal slurry pipelines in the
United States [hereinafter cited as TEKNEKRON].
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a ton of coal, extensive opposition to their development has arisen in
coal-producing, semiarid western states.33 Proposed slurry pipelines are
also being hindered by the railroads, which, fearing the loss of coal
traffic revenue,34 refuse to grant rights-of-way across their lands.3
Three proposed coal slurry pipelines are located in the semiarid
Southwest; they are the San Marco Pipeline, Energy Transportation
System, Inc. (ETSI) Pipeline, and Allen-Warner Valley Energy System
(Alton) Pipeline. The San Marco Pipeline Company, owned jointly
by the Houston Natural Gas Corporation and Rio Grande Industries,
Inc., a holding company of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, has
proposed a 1,000-mile pipeline system to move approximately 15 million
tons of coal a year from Walsenberg in southeastern Colorado to several
generating facilities in Houston and the Texas Gulf Coast area. This
pipeline, with its terminus at a facility on the Intercoastal Waterway,
is expected to move approximately 15 million tons of coal a year and
to require 15,000 acre-feet of water36 annually."' It can be constructed
as soon as water supplies are secured, because Texas, where almost
all of the line will be located, has eminent domain coverage for coal
slurry pipelines."
Energy Transportation System, Inc. (ETSI) was organized in 19731,
to construct a coal slurry pipeline to transport coal from the Powder
River Basin in Wyoming to power plants in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Louisiana. Initially the pipeline was planned to carry 25 million tons
of low-sulfur coal annually in a 1,000-mile line ending in Arkansas,
33. See generally, Water Availability for Energy Development in the West: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Energy Production and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural
Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-50 (1978).
34. See Coal Pipeline Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 1609 Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
115-16 (1978) (remarks by William H. Dempsey, President, Ass'n of American Railroads) (loss
of business to slurry pipelines would be "catastrophic" for all rail industry). The Office of
Technology Assesssment concluded in a 1978 report on coal slurry pipelines that if the pipelines
being considered at that time were constructed, in the year 2000 the rail industry would lose
$688 million in net railway operating revenues, as measured in 1971 dollars, of which $628 million
would be lost by western railroads. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 75.
35. The proposed coal pipeline from Gillette, Wyoming, to Arkansas, for example, will cross
under the tracks of nine railroads at 48 crossings; only one railroad as of 1976 has been willing
to grant a right-of-way to the pipeline. See 122 CONG. REc. 22455 (1976) (remarks by Rep. Max
Baucus).
36. One acre-foot of water is equal to 326,000 gallons. McDaniel, supra note 14, at 534 n. 10.
37. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 179; TEKNEKRON, supra note 32,
at p. 2-2.
38. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.019(a), .302(a) (Vernon 1978). See 1981 Cdal Pipeline
Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 179.
39. See supra note 1 for the ownership of the ETSI.
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but subsequently the project was expanded to a throughput of 37.4
million tons of coal per year and a length of 1,664 miles. The planned
terminus is now near Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with nine delivery sites
en route. 0
The Allen-Warner Valley Energy System (Alton) Pipeline is a
183-mile, 22-inch-diameter line proposed by Nevada Power Company
to transport eight million tons of coal a year from Alton, Utah to
the Harry Allen power plant in southeastern Nevada. Another com-
ponent of that line is a 73-mile, 12-inch-diameter pipeline to deliver
two million tons of coal annually from the same mine to the Warner
Valley power plant in southwestern Utah. The preparation plant and
two pipelines would require approximately 10,000 acre-feet of water
per year, all of which would be pumped from 13 deep wells drilled
into the Navajo Sandstone Aquifer underlying the mine area.4'
Other proposed western coal slurry pipelines include the Gulf Inter-
state-Northwest Pipeline between Gillette, Wyoming and Washington
state; Interprovincial-Lakehead System Pipeline from Alberta, Canada
through the Great Lakes states to eastern New York state; Wytex Pipeline
between Gillette, Wyoming and Houston, Texas; and Powder River
Pipeline from southeastern Montana to Lake Michigan. A proposed
line in the eastern part of the country, Florida Pipeline, would carry
coal from southern Illinois to eastern West Virginia in two northern
branches to Miami. 2
II. Problems and Benefits Associated With Coal
Slurry Pipelines Versus Unit Trains
Proposed coal pipelines would compete primarily with the high-
volume, lorg-distance coal transportation market now dominated by
the unit train. Unit trains, consisting of six locomotives pulling ap-
proximately 100 permanently coupled hopper cars, shuttle continuously
between the coal-producing area and the shippers' coal-burning facilities.
A unit train making weekly round-trips delivers 500,000 tons of coal
per year.3 While reducing equipment assignment and switching costs
40. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 179; TEKNEKRON, supra note 32,
at pp. 2-5, 2-6. As originally 'planned, the ETSI Wyoming to Arkansas pipeline to transport
25 million tons of coal annually would require an equivalent amount of- water by weight, or
6.25 billion gallons annually. One ton of water equals 250 gallons of water. Note, supra note
11, at 456 & n.57.
41. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 178-79; TEKNEKRON, supra note 32,
at pp. 2-12, 2-13.
42. Note, supra note 11, at 451; TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at fig. 1-1, p. 1-2.
43. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 29.
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of conventional railway systems, unit trains actually increase equip-
ment utilization rates and can haul coal for 40% less than conven-
tional rail carriage."
Financial Costs
Coal slurry pipeline advocates contend'that tremendous cost savings
will result from pipeline operations. Pipelines demand a large initial
capital investment;"5 however, about 70% of the unit cost of a pipeline
will be met once the pipes are in the ground and pumps installed.
' 6
The remaining 30% of the unit cost is in variable costs relating to elec-
tricity, labor, and supplies.,7 Railroads, on the other hand, have far
greater variable costs than pipelines. For example, labor alone amounts
to more than 50% of railroad costs.8 Generally the cost per ton-mile
of hauling coal by railroads is constant over distance; the length of
the route affects the rail cost proportionately.9 Conversely, the longer
a coal pipeline is, the less the transportation cost per ton-mile.0
Therefore, a large volume of coal must be transported over a long
distance to a single market for a slurry pipeline to maximize its economic
advantages.5 '
Economic Impact
Coal is the largest single commodity carried by the railroads;2 the
bulk of this coal moves in noncompetitive markets.3 Railroads con-
tend that implementing coal slurry pipelines would cripple their
revitalization efforts and could even cause bankruptcy among the weaker
rail companies." Advocates of coal slurry pipelines contend that the
44. D. WHITE, AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES FOR MEETING TEXAS' IN-
DUSTRIAL DEMAND FOR WESTERN COAL THROUGH THE YEAR 2000, at 44 (Univ. of Texas-Austin,
Center for Energy Studies, Pub. Info. Rep. No. 4, 1978) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS COAL
TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES].
45. For example, the initially planned ETSI pipeline from Wyoming to Arkansas was ex-
pected to cost $750 million. ETSI REPORT, supra note I, at 15.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 17.
49. See TEXAS COAL TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES, supra note 44, at 48-49.
50. Id. at 67.
51. Note, supra note 11, at 455. Promoters of the ETSI Wyoming-Arkansas pipeline believed
that it would save the Arkansas utility company $14 billion in transportation costs over a 30-year
period. See Webber, supra note 22, at 771 for further discussion of the cost factors.
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, A PROSPECTUS FOR CHANGE IN THE FREIGHT RAILROAD
INDUSTRY 110 (1978). In 1975 coal accounted for almost 30% of volume and more than 13%
of revenues of Class I railroads. Id.
53. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 7, at 464-65.
54. See Lorentzsen, Coal Slurry Pipelines: A Railroad Perspective, 10 TRAsP. L.J. 153,
165-66, 169 (1978). See Note, supra note 11, at 458-59 for further discussion.
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railroads will not be able to handle the increased coal traffic expected
during the next few years and that the present coal rates charged by
railroads are too high. These rates are sometimes as high as 140% above
variable costs." Even if all of the proposed coal pipelines are operating
by 1990, they would carry less than 150 million tons of coal or about
10% of the country's requirements.6 In light of this relatively small
market share of coal being transported by pipelines and the rapid ex-
pansion of the overall market for coal, coal pipelines should not seriously
impair revenues of the railroad industry.7
Water Consumption
Promoters of the coal slurry pipelines contend that the maximum
annual water use for such lines would amount to only 13% of one
day's total water use in the country, and on a year-to-year basis, max-
imum coal pipeline water use would account for less than 4/100ths
of 1% of total use. Viewed another way, in twenty-five years of opera-
tion, maximum water use by pipeline systems would equal three and
one-third days of total water use.8 The least costly source of water
is from the state in which the coal formations are located.9 However,
most of the proposed pipelines are located in the semiarid western states
where water is a valuable and scarce resource. In contrast to the
pipelines, unit trains hauling coal from mines to users at industrial
centers need very little water.
Several water source alternatives are available to coal slurry pipelines.
One such source would be water that is too contaminated or too ex-
pensive for other purposes. For example, pipeline operators could
develop industrial quality water sources, such as sewage treatment plant
effluent and brackish underground aquifers, and make available addi-
tional supplies of such water for other industrial uses.60 Another alter-
native would be to require pipeline operators to construct a parallel
water pipeline and to require the ultimate users of the coal to supply
the water.6' A third alternative would be to pump the water in from
some distant abundant water source.62 Still another alternative would
be to recycle the water by constructing a parallel pipeline and then,
55. Note, supra note i1, at 459-60.
56. See HousE Comm. ON INTERIOR AND INsuLAR AFFAIRS, COAL PIPELINE ACT OF 1979, H.R.
REP. No. 692, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 692].
57. See Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 10, at 171.
58. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 197.
59. See generally HUDSON REPORT, supra note 6, at 127-28.
60. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 199.
61. Comment, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues Raised by the Development of
Coal Slurry Pipelines, 13 Hous. L. Ruv. 528, 547 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
62. Note, supra note 11, at 457.
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after separating the water from the coal at the plant site, returning
the water to the coal-producing site to be reused.6 3 All of these alter-
natives would increase the capital and operating expenses of the pipeline
and some pipeline advocates think that the increased costs would not




There are both advantages and disadvantages, environmentally, to
the use of coal slurry pipelines. Obviously the effects of pipelines on
the environment are quite different from the effects of unit train
operations .6 Environmental impacts of unit trains include locomotive
air pollution, coal dust emissions from open hopper cars, interference
with surface activities, dislocation of wildlife, and community dis-
turbances in terms of visual and noise pollution, as well as traffic dis-
ruptions and accidents." Many of these disturbances are minimized
or eliminated by coal pipelines in that the pipelines are almost com-
pletely underground and are quiet, clean, and invisible. 7
Because a coal pipeline is a water intensive technology, one serious
environmental question is where pipeline operators will obtain the large
amounts of water necessary to operate. A coal slurry line transporting
sufficient coal for a city of two million persons would require about
15,000 acre-feet of water per year, which is about one-half of the an-
nual municipal water consumption in Wyoming.68 Although water is
physically available for western pipelines, slurry water would compete
directly with other possible future uses. Pipeline advocates point out,
however, that the impact on nonindustrial users can be lessened through
the use of deep groundwater unsuitable for municipal or agricultural
uses and by more efficient irrigation techniques. Additionally, although
slurry water is lost to its source, the water is available for use at the
terminal facility. 69
The implementation of coal slurry pipelines would undoubtedly re-
quire institutional trade offs both within the energy development field
and among all other water users. But when compared to other coal
63. HuDsoN REPORT, supra note 6, at 134.
64. For example, a water recycling system has been reported to add about 38 to 40% to
the costs of moving coal by slurry pipeline. Id.
65. TEx As COAL TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES, supra note 44, at 107.
66. Note, supra note 11, at 453; 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 191;
Webber, supra note 22, at 773.
67. 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 191; Webber, supra note 22, at 773.
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users, coal pipelines are relatively water efficient.7" Coal-fired electrical
generation, for instance, requires up to seven times the water required
by a slurry line.7' When the alternative to transmitting coal by pipelines
is generation of electricity or coal gasification at the coal source,
allocating water to pipelines may be preferable to the use of far greater
amounts of water required for conversion at the source site."
Coal slurry pipeline or utility companies will have to satisfy federal
and state requirements under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. 3 Any discharge from the site of preparation
of the coal for movement through the pipeline, as well as any discharge
along the route or at its terminus, will require National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits.74 Moreover, such a facility in
connection with the pipeline will likely be a "new source" and if con-
structed under federal authority will require an environmental impact
assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act."
III. San Marco Pipeline
As previously stated, the San Marco Pipeline Company has proposed
constructing a 1,000-mile pipeline to move approximately 10 million
tons of coal per year from southeastern Colorado to several generating
facilities south of Houston, Texas; this operation would require 15,000
acre-feet of water annually. The area from which this proposed pipeline
.would originate, comprising the southern Colorado portion of the Rio
Grande Basin, has severe water supply problems. Several factors, in-
cluding extremely low levels of precipitation, high agricultural demand,
and the water delivery requirements of the Rio Grande River Compact,76
account for the problems. A large portion of the sparsely populated
and economically depressed basin is mountainous and covered with
forests, while the alluvial valley floor is used for crop production and
as rangelands. The cattle and sheep industry is a major part of the
70. H.R. REP. No. 692, supra note 56, at 17. See generally TEXAS COAL TRANSPORTATION
ALTERNAT VES, supra note 44, at 36-37; Comment, supra note 61, at 546.
71. TEcHNoLooY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 91. See generally Abbey, Energy Production
and Water Resources in the Colorado River Basin, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 275, 285-88 (1979).
72. Electrical generation at the coal source requires eight times the water used by a coal
pipeline, while synfuel production requires more than twice the water needed to slurry coal. H.R.
Rm. No. 692, supra note 56, at 17. For further discussion on water needs for coal development,
see Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal Development, 51 U. CoLo. L. REv. 511, 517-23 (1980).
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also 1981 Coal Pipeline Act Hearings,
supra note 15, at 191-201.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1976).
76. See COLO. RE V. STAT. § 37-66-101 to -102 (1973) for contents of Rio Grande River Compact.
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basin's economy, but overgrazing has caused serious soil erosion."
Because the frost-free season in this area lasts only between three
and four months and the rainfall averages under 10 inches per year,
the number of crops grown are limited primarily to lettuce, malting
barley, potatoes, alfalfa, grass hay, and wheat. Most land is irrigated
and at present there are 609,000 irrigated acres in that basin. More
than 90% of the basin's water use is for agriculturally related pur-
poses. Surface waters in the basin are generated mainly from snow
melt and runoff of the San Juan and Sangre de Cristo mountains.
Adequate water reserves are not available in the basin because of this
surface water source and the time of year it is available. The average
annual quantity of runoff water is 1,577,000 acre-feet, although this
varies significantly from year to year. Monthly variations in runoff
are also considerable because snow melt runoff generally peaks during
May and early June and drains out of state, while demand is highest
during July and early August.78
If the entire yearly supply of 1,577,000 acre-feet of surface water
were made available for irrigating the 609,000 acres of cropland in
the basin, with an efficiency use of 50% and adequate storage facilities,
the amount of water available would be 1.29 acre-feet per acre, which
is more than enough for the cropland needs.79 This, however, is not
the case because transpiration by low-value phreatophytes,0 evapora-
tion, and loss to downstream states under the Rio Grande River Com-
pact obligations reduce the amount of water available for productive
use."1 Only about 29 7o of the surface water available at the point of
diversion is available for irrigation, which is only about 25% of the
irrigation requirements during most of the growing season.
8 2
Groundwater pumping partially makes up the yearly shortfall. Dur-
ing an average year approximately 279,000 acre-feet of groundwater
is consumptively used for irrigation purposes, which requires ground-
77. TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at p. 4-3.
78. Id. For further discussion of Colorado water problems, see Harrison & Sandstrom, Jr.,
The Groundwater-Surface Water Coiflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1971).
79. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, WATER AND
RELATED LAND RESOURCES: Rio GRANDE BASIN COLORADO, at p. 111-1 (Denver, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD].
80. Phreatophytes are deep-rooted plants, such as cottonwood or salt-cedar trees, which con-
sume water directly from the free water table in the alluvial valley. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra
note 78, at 2 n.3.
81. See generally id. at 2-3.
82. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, supra note 79, at pp. 111-2, 111-11. See also
TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at pp. 4-5, 4-6. See V. BENSON, C. EVERSON, & R. SHARP, IRRIGA-
TION SYSTEM SELECTION IN AN ENERGY-SHORT ECONOMY 5-6 (Econ. Research Service Rep. No.
670, 1981) for a discussion of efficiency of various irrigation systems.
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water withdrawals averaging about 411,000 acre-feet a year." Even
with combining surface and groundwater there is an average 13% ir-
rigation water shortfall in the basin. This translates into smaller than
possible agricultural yield per acre, less acres planted, and substitution
of crops that can be planted earlier in the season and that are generally
less water-consumptive but have less economic value. 4
Additional groundwater pumping could conceivably make up this
shortfall because it is estimated that as much as 2 billion acre-feet of
water is contained in the aquifers below the basin.8 However, it is
not economical to pump most of this water" and the quality of much
of it is poor. A determination has not been made on the amount of
good quality water that is available for irrigation. Sixteen of the 25
communities in the Rio Grande Basin experience some type of municipal
water supply problems, but in most instances those problems are because
of inadequate storage, handling, and distribution facilities rather than
the lack of water availability.
Alamosa, Costilla, Conejos, and Rio Grande counties are directly
affected by the proposed San Marco Pipeline, and these four counties
are among the major producing counties of potatoes, spring wheat,
and barley in Colorado. Almost 80% of the total production of potatoes
in Colorado is produced in these four counties, as well as a dispropor-
tionately high percentage of barley and spring wheat. Even more critical
is that these counties are among the minority of counties in the state
that have absolutely no nonirrigated acreage planted for spring wheat
or barley, essentially because of the low levels of precipitation. Con-
sequently, surface water sources are of critical importance to the area.
Surface water for these four counties comes principally from the
Rio Grande and Conejos rivers and Culebra Creek, which are also the
surface water sources closest to the proposed San Marco Pipeline well
fields. If the San Marco source is tributary to the Rio Grande River
and Culebra Creek, as local water users contend, then pumping from
those well fields could have a significant impact on the surface water
sources, particularly during dry years. Consequently, the stream flow
83. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BoARD, supra note 79, at p. IV-30.
84. TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at p. 4-6.
85. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, supra note 79, at p. IV-30.
86. The energy requirement for pumping a given quantity of water 500 feet is 10 times as
great as for 50 feet. G. SLOGErT, PROSPECTS roR GROUND-WATER IRIGATION: DECLINING LEVELS
AND RisING ENEROY COSTS 13 (Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 478, 1981). See id. at 13-20 for further
discussion.
87. U.S. BuREAu oF RECLAMTION, WATER FOR TOmORRow-CoLoRDo STATE VATER PLAN,
at p. 6.8 (1974).
88. See TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at pp. 4-26, 4-27.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
of these surface waters and especially the extent of fluctuations during
dry years is of great importance.
Streamflow of the Rio Grande River and Culebra Creek is even
more critical in the four-county area because the annual precipitation
in the southern part of the basin is among the lowest in Colorado;9
reservoir storage capacity is comparatively small;90 and the Rio Grande
River Compact requires Colorado to send a specified quantity of
water to New Mexico every year.9' These factors seriously intensify
the effect of seasonal streamflow fluctuations, which along with annual
fluctuations are considerable. Annual streamflow of the Rio Grande
as it enters the four-county area fluctuated during the past five years
from a high of 925,000 acre-feet in 1978 to a low of 215,000 acre-
feet in 1977. Similar deviations exist for the Conejos River and Culebra
Creek and the Rio Grande as it passes into New Mexico. 9" Of even
greater importance than the annual streamflow fluctuations are the
fluctuating levels of consumption necessitated by surface water avail-
ability in the area. High consumption of surface water is absolutely
necessary to avoid excessive groundwater depletion. In dry years, when
the surface water consumption is often less than one-fourth that of
peak wet years, groundwater depletions are estimated to approximate
I million acre-feet.9 3
San Marco Pipeline Company has been unable to obtain state per-
mits for the required water allotment. It applied to the Colorado state
engineer in June 1976 under a statute applicable to areas outside the
boundaries of a designated groundwater basin for permits to construct
wells that would appropriate up to 15,000 acre-feet of groundwater
from a well field in Costilla County in southeastern Colorado.4 The
89. Data recorded at three stations in the basin closest to the well fields indicate precipitation
ranged from 3.5 to 11.5 inches per year over the last fifty years. Id. at p. 4-28, 4-29.
90. Full storage capacity for the basin is 376,960 acre-feet and some of that is used exclusively
for recreational purposes. Id. at p. 4-30.
91. See Rio Grande River Compact, art. III, in CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-66-101 (1973). The
quantity varies according to an elaborate formula based principally on the amount of seasonal
snowfall. Colorado has been unable t'o meet the allotments since 1952 and has built up a large
"debt" to New Mexico, which now is almost 700,000 acre-feet. TEKNEKRON, supra note 32,
at pp. 4-7, 4-31.
92. See TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at tables 4-6 to 4-9, pp. 4-32 to 4-38.
93. Id. at p. 4-8.
94. See CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 37-90-137 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982). San Marco, however,
did not specify the specific subsection of the statute under which it applied for the permit. CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(1) (1973) applies to permits for the construction of wells to take water
from aquifers that are either tributary or nontributary to surface water and are located outside
the boundaries of a designated groundwater basin, which applies to about 70% of the state.
CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 37-90-137(4) (1973) applies to permits for the construction of wells to take
water from nontributary bedrock, nonrecharging aquifers located outside the boundaries of a
designated groundwater basin. Permit applicants must own or control all of the land above the
aquifer and the minimum useful life of the aquifer must be 100 years.
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company contended that the small aquifer underlying the well field
was not hydrologically connected to the surface flow of any nearby
Colorado watercourse,95 nor was it tributary to any other groundwater
basin; therefore, the aquifer from which the pipeline water would be
pumped would not affect any other source of water in the area. San
Marco also contended that the area in the immediate vicinity of the
well fields is relatively barren and that under no circumstances could
agricultural production be increased. The state engineer denied the
permit application, citing Colorado's "antiexport" statute prohibiting
the export of groundwater out of state96 and claiming that the com-
pany had failed to specify the particular designated aquifer from which
the water was to be diverted97 and to submit sufficient data on the
hydrologic characteristics of the aquifer. As San Marco did not specify
under which subsection of the statute it was applying for a permit9"
and there was a dispute over this issue between San Marco and the
state engineer,99 the state engineer felt justified in denying the applica-
tion based on failure to specify groundwater sought. '
In December 1976, San Marco Pipeline Company filed an applica-
tion With the district court of Water Division No. 3 (water court)'0 '
for an adjudication of conditional underground water rights'0 2 in the
aquifer underlying the well field in Costilla County for which the com-
pany had previously applied for a permit to appropriate. 3 Nearly forty
interested parties, including the state of Colorado, entered the case
0
95. The aquifer was tributary, however, to a creek in New Mexico.
96. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1973).
97. This is one of the requirements for approval under CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(1)
(1973). See supra note 94.
98. Whether it was under CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(1) (1973) or id. § 37-90-137(4). See
supra note 94.
99. The state engineer believed the application should have been made under CoLo. REv.
STAT. § 37-90-137(4) (1973). This subsection applies to nontributary, nonrecharging bedrock aquifers
in nondesignated groundwater basins and the water supply will last at least 100 years. The permit
applicant would have to control all of the land over the well field, which was not the case for
San Marco Pipeline Company, hence its reason for not filing permit application under that
subsection.
100. See Stonewall Estates v. CF & I Steel Corp., 197 Colo. 255, 592 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1979).
101. The Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969 divided the state into
seven water divisions, each with a district judge filling the position of water judge. Each water
judge is given exclusive jurisdiction of water matters within the division. The statute does not
use the term "water court," but the term is commonly used to designate the court in which
the water judge presides under the Act. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-201, 203 (1973). Water District
No. 3 is composed of nine counties in south-central Colorado. Id. § 37-92-201(l)(c).
102. Conditional water rights means rights to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon
the completion with a reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such water rights
are to be based. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1973).
103. In re Application for Water Rights of San Marco Pipeline Co., No. W-3665 (Colo. D.C.
Water Div. 3, filed Dec. 30, 1976). See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(l)(a) (1973) for procedure
for adjudication of water rights.
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as "objectors" contending that the groundwater pumping would fur-
ther intensify the area's chronic water shortage. The water court granted
a motion for summary judgment late in 1981 in favor of the objectors
on the grounds that it is unlawful to divert groundwater for use out-
side the state'0 4 and that the water court had no jurisduction over a
water source that .is not tributary to any surface stream in the state.,05
San Marco amended its application, taking the position that there is
a hydrologic connection between its proposed water source and at least
two surface water sources, but that pumping from its groundwater
source would not affect the surface streams.'0 6 The case is now pend-
ing a decision from the water judge on-the objectors' motion to dismiss
on the grounds that it is unlawful to export groundwater out of the
state'0 7 and pumping the groundwater would impact certain streams.
This case involves an internal state problem because water is public
property and it is the state's responsibility to protect the water rights
of its people.'
IV. Colorado Water Law
The common law doctrine of riparian rights gives owners of riparian
lands a qualified right to the waters flowing past their property regardless
of whether the owners use the rights. It denies water rights to any land-
owner whose property is not riparian, that is, property that does not
abut on a stream, regardless of the need or purpose.109 From the very
beginning, miners and settlers of the western states rejected the common
law doctrine and developed the convention of prior appropriation, which
was better suited for governing the use of limited water resources over
104. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1973).
105. The Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969 pertains to surface
and underground water. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(l)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Underground
water is that water in unconsolidated alluvial aquifers and all other waters hydraulically con-
nected thereto that can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water in those alluvial
aquifers or natural streams. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(11) (1973). See Stonewall Estates v.
CF & I Steel Corp., 197 Colo. 225, 592 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1979).
106. San Marco continues to maintain that pumping from its water source meets the following
three essential criteria: (1) would not reduce the current agricultural production of any area in
Colorado; (2) would not be in conflict with any proposed agricultural or municipal development
in the state; and (3) would not adversely affect the vested water rights of any other water ap-
propriator in the state.
107. COLO. REV. ST.AT. § 37-90-136 (1973).
108. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-82-101 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
109. 1 S. WEL, WATER RIHTS N THE WEsTEm STATES § 685 (3d ed. 1911). See 1 D. LAROE,
LAND APPLICATION OF WASTEWATER AND STATE WATER LAW: AN OVERViEW 7-27 (Environmen-
tal Protection Technology Series EPA-600/2-77-232, 1977) [hereinafter cited as I LARGE], for
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vast areas of semiarid land."10 Under the prior appropriation doctrine,
the first person to appropriate (divert) water from a stream for a
beneficial use on any land is entitled to the continued use of that amount
of water appropriated as long as the beneficial application continues.'
Once waters have been fully appropriated, new users cannot divert water
upstream and deprive prior appropriators of their established uses. In
times of water shortage a senior appropriator's rights are satisfied in
full before junior appropriators can assert their shares."2
California was the first state to approve the doctrine of prior appro-
priation in Irwin v. Phillips,"3 although its approval was limited to
water used for mining on federal lands. The extension of the appropria-
tion doctrine to validate the priority of nonmining uses both on and
outside federal lands quickly followed the Irwin case."4 Both the Col-
orado and Wyoming supreme courts held that riparian rights were never
available in the West and that the doctrine of prior appropriation
was the governing law." 5 The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity ...
The right to water in this country, by priority of appropriation
thereof, we think it is, and has always been, the duty of the na-
tional and state governments to protect. The right itself, and the
obligation to protect it, existed prior to legislation on the subject
of irrigation. It is entitled to protection as well after patent to a
110. G. RADosEvICH, K. NoBE, D. ALLARDICE, & C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLUTION AND ADzuINISTRA-
T1ON OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976, 20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COLORADO WATER
LAW]. See Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of Government-States' Rights vs. National
Powers, 19 Wyo. L.J. 189, 194 (1965), in which the author stated that the "invention of prior
appropriation was a master stroke in which the Western states justifiably take pride." See 1
LARGE, supra note 109, at 30-33 for a short discussion of the history of the appropriation doctrine.
111. Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 26, 276 P. 1017, 1026 (1929). See I
LARGE, supra note 109, at 28-49 for a discussion of the appropriation doctrine as it relates to
natural water courses, surface waters, and groundwater.
112. Comment, Paleface, Redskin, and the Great White Chiefs in Washington: Drawing the
Battle Lines over Western Water Rights, 17 SAN DIEoo L. REV. 449, 476 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Drawing Battle Lines]. See Trelease, supra note 110, at 194-95, where he indicated that
the rule of prior appropriation was not as harsh as it appears. Subsequent reapportionment of
available water among users as they entered the area would eventually result in insufficient waters
to allow anyone to prosper. As such, junior water appropriators are encouraged to develop alter-
native groundwater sources, to build dams to store flood and rain water, to transport water
from greater distances, or to purchase water rights from senior appropriators.
113. 5 Cal. 140 (1855). See COLORADO WATER LAW, supra note 110, at 20.
114. Rupley v. Welch, 23 Cal. 452 (1863); Tartar v. Spring Creek Water & Mining Co., 5
Cal. 395 (1855). See I LARGE, supra note 109, at 30-33.
115. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882); Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo.
308, 44 P. 845 (1896).
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third party of the land over which the natural stream flows, as
when such land is a part of the public domain; and it is immaterial
whether or not it be mentioned in the patent and expressly excluded
from the grant.""
Establishment of Right to Appropriate Water
The basic principle applicable to the establishment of rights to ap-
propriate water under the prior appropriation doctrine is "he who is
first in time is first in right.""' 7 An appropriation of water for beneficial
use begins as a conditional water right and is effected as of the time
the "first step" is taken to secure it.' A conditional water right or
decree is a vested property right as of the date of the first step taken
subject to forfeiture if the holder fails to pursue his conditional water
right with reasonable diligence."9 A diversion and application of water
to some beneficial use is necessary to establish a priority and complete
an appropriation.2
Beneficial use has been broadly defined over the years. Early defini-
tions included irrigation,"' mining, domestic and municipal,'" and
milling 24 uses.'2-Electrical power generation,2 6 propagation of fish,127
watering growing trees and grass in public parks,28 and stock watering' 9
were later recognized as beneficial uses.3 Colorado statutes also in-
clude in the definition the impoundment of water for recreational pur-
poses and appropriation by the state of minimum flows to preserve
116. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882).
117. Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 26, 276 P. 1017, 1026 (1929). See I
LARGE, supra note 109, at 28-29.
118. Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 386-87, 276 P.2d
992, 998 (1954). The first essential of an appropriation is the actual diversion of the water with
intent to apply to a beneficial use.
119. Mooney v. Kuiper, 194 Colo. 477, 573 P.2d 538, 539 (1978); Rocky Mtn. Power Co.
v. White River Elec. Ass'n, 151 Colo. 45, 53, 376 P.2d 158, 162 (1962). See CoLO. REv. STAT.
§ 37-92-301(4) (1973).
120. Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 386-87, 276 P.2d
992, 998 (1954); Ft. Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 3-5,
30 P. 1032, 1033 (1892); Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo.
111, 114-15, 21 P. 1028, 1029 (1889).
121. Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co., 12 Colo. 525, 530-33, 21 P. 711,
712-13 (1889).
122. Fuller v. Swan River Pacer Min. Co., 12 Colo. 12, 19 P. 836 (1888).
123. Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 69, 26 P. 313, 317-18 (1891).
124. Cache ]a Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 25 Colo. 161, 53 P.
331 (1898).
125. 3 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 219-20 (1977).
126. Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 F. 1011, 1016 (D. Colo. 1910).
127. Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 368, 28 P.2d 247, 250-51 (1933).
128. Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 222-23, 138 P. 44, 47-48 (1914).
129. Hehl Eng'g Co. v. Hubbell, 132 Colo. 96, 100, 285 P.2d 593, 595 (1955).
130. 3 HUTCHINS, supra note 125, at 220.
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the natural environment to a reasonable degree.3 ' Water may be ap-
propriated for immediate application or for storage, but an appropria-
tion for one of these uses is not an appropriation for the other.1
32
What constitutes the first step to initiate the conditional water right
is not the same in every proposed appropriation because the facts must
be taken into consideration in each case on an ad hoc basis. 33 Generally,
it has been held that the required first step must consist of open, physical
demonstration on the land in order to give notice to others of the ap-
propriators' intentions. 31 More recent Colorado cases have held that
two requirements must coexist to constitute the first step of an ap-
propriation: open physical demonstration on the land must be accom-
panied by the requisite intent to appropriate.'35 The priority date for
an appropriation may not precede the time when both elements are
present, and in any adjudication of the priority date, the appropriator
must submit proof that both requirements were met on that date.36
131. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973). See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570, 575-77 (1979).
132. Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irrig. Co., 86 Colo. 197, 199-200, 280 P. 481,
481-82 (1929); Holbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 191, 269 P. 574,
581 (1928); 3 HuTCHiNs, supra note 125, at 221.
133. Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 445, 484 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1971); Four
Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conseriation Dist., 159 Colo. 449, 509,
414 P.2d 469, 475 (1966).
134. Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 445, 484 P.2d 1211, 1215 (1971); Sieber
v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 153, 2 P. 901, 903 (1884). See also Fruitland Irrig. Co. v. Kruemling,
62 Colo. 160, 165, 162 P. 161, 163 (1916), which provides some basic guidelines for determining
what constitutes the "first step" to establish a priority date or date of first appropriation:
[T]he first step.., is nothing short of an open and notorious physical demonstra-
tion, conclusively indicating a fixed purpose to diligently pursue and, within a
reasonable time, ultimately acquire a right to the use of water, and as its primary
function is to give notice to those subsequently desiring to initiate similar rights,
it must necessarily be of such a character that they may fairly be said to be thereby
charged with at least such notice as would reasonably be calculated to put them
on inquiry of the prospective extent of the proposed use and consequent demand
upon the water supply involved.
135. Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 485, 484 P.2d 1211, 1215 (1971).
136. See id. at 444-47, 484 P.2d at 1214-15, where it emphasizes the Colorado Supreme Court's
search for the point in time when open and notorious acts on the land combine with the ap-
propriator's actual intent to appropriate. In that case, the appropriator had first spent two months
compiling information about the terrain and making plans for the construction of a reservoir.
The company officials then reviewed the plans and decided to file engineering plans with the
state engineer's office and proceed with a full survey. The court set the priority date for that
appropriation on the date of the official's meeting. See also Fruitland Irrig. Co. v. Kruemling,
62 Colo. 160, 165-67, 162 P. 161, 163 (1916), wherein the supreme court held that neither the
removal of rocks, nor the purchase of the land, nor even the first survey was sufficient to con-
stitute a first step establishing the date of appropriation, because Fruitland Irrigation had not
yet decided that its reservoir project was economical or even feasible. The court considered the
above actions to be merely preliminary or reconnaissance. The date of appropriation was set
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Although, an appropriation is not complete until there is an actual
diversion and use of water, the right acquired by application to a
beneficial use may relate back to the first substantial act (first step)
of the appropriator to establish the appropriation. This is known as
the relation-back doctrine, whose importance cannot be overestimated.
It would be impossible for any private enterprise to risk large amounts
of capital, as is often necessary, to complete a water appropriation,
especially for transmountain diversion, without assurance of a condi-
tional decree. 31 The right to have an appropriation priority date relate
back is conditional that construction after the first step is pursued with
reasonable diligence and conditional further that there was a fixed and
definite purpose to use the water for a particular purpose within a
reasonable time. What constitutes "reasonable diligence" and "fixed
and definite purpose" are questions of fact." 8
The Colorado court has held that perfecting a conditional water right
with reasonable diligence "does not require unusual efforts or expen-
ditures, but only such constancy in the pursuit of the undertaking as
is usual with those in like enterprises, [and] such assiduity as shows
a bonafide intention to complete it within a reasonable time."'19 The
question of diligence must be determined in light of all facts present
in a particular case, including the size and complexity of the project,
the extent of the construction season, the availability of materials, labor
and equipment, the economic ability of the claimant, and the interven-
tion of outside delaying factors such as wars, strikes, and litigation.140
Few standards exist for whether an appropriator has a "fixed and
definite purpose" for the use of the water to which the appropriator
claims a conditional water right. It has been stated that an appropriator's
at the time a detailed survey was begun, for then Fruitland Irrigation was actually committed
to its appropriation for a reservoir.
137. Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 Colo. 384, 390-91, 106 P.2d 363, 366-67
(1940).
138. Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 388-89, 276 P.2d
992, 999 (1954). See also Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 Colo. 384, 391-92,
106 P.2d 363, 366-67 (1940); Fruitland Irrig. Co. v. Kruemling, 62 Colo. 160, 167, 162 P. 161,
163-64 (1916); Seiber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 151-52, 2 P. 901, 902-03 (1884).
139. Highland Ditch Co. v. Mumford, 5 Colo 325, 336 (1880). See also Denver v; Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 399, 276 P.2d 992, 1004 (1954), wherein
"diligence" is defined to mean "the steady application to business of any kind, constant effort
to accomplish any undertaking. It is the doing of an act or series of acts with all possible ex-
pedition, with no delay except such as may be incident to the work itself."
140. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 171
Colo. 561, 567, 468 P.2d 853, 856 (1970); Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 397-402, 276 P.2d 992, 1004-06 (1954); Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water
& Dev. Co., 106 Colo. 384, 390-92, 106 P.2d 363, 366-67 (1940).
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purpose must be definite enough to give others affirmative notice of
the appropriator's interest.'
4'
Courts have emphasized that the Colorado constitution guarantees
a right to appropriate, not a right to speculate, and the right to ap-
propriate is for use, not merely for profit. 42 One court rejected the
claims of mere speculators because they did not intend to appropriate
and use the water for a beneficial use themselves. A claim for mere
speculative purposes will not give the appropriator any rights against
subsequent good faith appropriations.43 It should be noted, however,
that a city has the right not only to appropriate enough water for its
immediate use but also to acquire an adequate supply to satisfy its
needs resulting from a normal increase in population within a reasonable
time in the future. Further, municipalities may lease water in excess
of immediate requirements to other uses pending the times at which
it will be needed.44
Water appropriation rights are real property rights.'45 These property
rights extend both to the quantity of the water appropriated and to
the priority of the right, which usually accounts for the chief value
of the property interest. 4 Water rights are possessory rights, however,
and are dependent upon the continuous application of the water to
a beneficial use. 47 The appropriative right is separate from the land
141. Holbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 190-91, 269 P. 574, 581
(1928). See New Loveland & Greeley Irrig. & Land Co. v. Consolidated Home Supply Ditch
& Reservoir Co., 27 Colo. 525, 528-31, 62 P. 366, 367-68 (1900), wherein the court held that
the priority date of a conditional water right only applied to the irrigation water the appropriator
first planned to use and not to the water used in a storage system built after the first system
was completed. Had the appropriator planned to build them both from the outset the early ap-
propriation date would have applied to both systems. See also Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water
& Dev. Co., 106 Colo. 384, 393-94, 106 P.2d 363, 368 (1940), wherein a water decree for "beneficial
purpbses other than irrigation" was held to be too indefinite. The court modified the develop-
ment company's decree so that it related "only to irrigation, domestic and municipal use." The
court took judicial notice that water was generally needed for these uses in the South Platte
basin where the water was allegedly to be used.
142. Harvey Land & Cattle Co. v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 631 P.2d
1111, 1114 (Colo. 1981); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co.,
197 Colo. 413, 594 P.2d 566, 568 (1979). See CoLo. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 5.
143. Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 408, 276 P.2d
992, 1008-09 (1954).
144. Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 202-04, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (1939).
145. Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 52-53, 279 P.2d 420,
425 (1955); Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 200, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (1939).
146. Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 27, 34 P. 278, 280 (1893); Strickler v. Colorado Springs,
16 Colo. 61, 70, 26 P. 313, 316 (1891).
147. Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 53, 279 P.2d 420,
425 (1955).
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for which it was appropriated and may be sold separately.'4 Rights
to change places of use are inherent as an incident of ownership, pro-
vided only that the rights of others are not infringed."4 9 Furthermore,
the Colorado court has held that the state constitution sanctions the
business of transporting water from natural streams for hire to distant
customers. 15 *
Many western states have forfeiture provisions in their statutes pro-
viding that an appropriative right has been forfeited because of a failure
to use the water for a specified number of years.' Colorado does
not have such a statute, but the court decided that abandonment
occurs when there is a nonuse coupled .with an intention to abandon."2
One must intend to discontinue permanently the use of part or all of
the water to abandon a water right. 3 Nonuse of the water for ten
years creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment for purposes
of tabulating water rights by the state engineer.1 54
Administration of Water Rights
Appropriation of water rights in Colorado has -traditionally been
regulated and administered by the judiciary.' Much of the court
precedent has. been compiled by the legislature into statutes to provide
a comprehensive water management scheme.'56 The state engineer is
responsible for the day-to-day administration and distribution of the
waters of the state,'57 while a separate state water rights determination
system within the judiciary has been established to handle the con-
tinuous adjudication of water rights in the state.'8 Colorado gives
148. See CoLO. R-v. STAT. § 37-85-102 (1973); Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61,
70-72, 26 P. 313, 316-17 (1891).
149. Nielson v. Newmyer, 123 Colo. 189, 192-93, 228 P.2d 456, 458-59 (1951). See Wanamaker
Ditch Co. v. Crane, 132 Colo. 366, 373-74, 288 P.2d 339, 343 (1955).
150. Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 588, 17 P. 487, 490 (1888).
See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 8; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-85-102 (1973).
151. 2 W. HuTcHiNs, WATER RIGOHTs LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 290 (1974).
152. CF & I Steel Corp. v. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist., 183 Colo. 135, 515
P.2d 456, 457-58 (1973).
153. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(2) (1973). See Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 53-54, 279 P.2d 420, 425-26 (1955). See also CF & I Steel Corp. v.
Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist. 183 Colo. 135, 515 P.2d 456, 458 (1973), which held
that nonuse for an unreasonable period creates a rebuttable presumption that there was an inten-
tion to abandon.
154. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
155. 2 HutrcI Ns, supra note 151, at 470-85.
156. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-82-101 to -106; 37-83-101 to -105; 37-84-101 to -125;
37-85-101 to -111; 37-86-101 to -113; 37-87-101 to -122; 37-90-101 to -141; 37-92-101 to -103
(1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
157. Id. § 37-80-101 to -120; 37-92-301.
158..Id. § 37-92-101 to -103.
[Vol. 36:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/28
1983] INTERSTATE TRANSFER OF COLORADO WATER 23
special consideration to groundwater.159 The law governing the ap-
propriation and use of groundwater may be divided into three categories
relating to (1) groundwater tributary to surface water,'0 (2) designated
groundwater basins,'6' and (3) nontributary and "nondesignated"
groundwater.'62
Colorado's constitution allows for appropriation of water from every
natural stream within the state for a beneficial use.6 3 It became the
natural assumption early in Colorado's history that all groundwater
was tributary to some natural stream and, therefore, could be ap-
propriated in the same manner as surface water. 6 Courts began later
to recognize what they at first called "artificially developed water"
and defined such water as that not reaching a surface stream in due
course. Appropriators could claim exclusive rights to such water and
escape prior appropriation considerations provided they assured the
court by a preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence that the
water was not tributary to any stream.'6
The question of what should be done with groundwater that is not
tributary to any natural stream was first raised in Safranek v. Town
of Limon, 66 but not answered because the court found the ground-
water in question was tributary to a stream.'67 In response to ques-
tions of ownership, administration, and the appropriate water law doc-
trine applicable to nontributary goundwater, the state passed the Col-
orado Ground Water Act of 1957.16 The purpose of that Act was to
protect groundwater by providing administrative facilities to control
its reasonable use and by providing a record of facts upon which such
reasonable use could be determined to prevent waste.69 After review-
ing the constitution and the Act, the supreme court concluded in Whitten
159. See 2 D. LARGE, LAND APPUCATION OF WASTEWATER AND STATE WATER LAW: STATE
ANyss 139-42 (Environmental Protection Technology Series EPA-600/2-78-175, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as 2 LARGE] for a discussion of Colorado groundwater law.
160. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(11), -301, -302 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982); Whitten v.
Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 164-65, 385 P.2d 131, 135 (1963).
161. CoLo. REa. STAT. §§ 37-90-103(6), (7), -107 to -109 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
162. Id. § 37-90-137 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
163. CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
164. Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 256-58, 133 P. 1107, 1111-12 (1913). See DeHaas
v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 350, 181 P.2d 453, 456 (1947).
165. DeHass v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 350, 181 P.2d 453, 456 (1947); Comrie v. Sweet,
75 Colo. 199, 201-02, 255 P. 214, 214-15 (1924).
166. 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
167. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 334-36, 228 P.2d 975, 977-78 (1951).
168. 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 289, §§ 1-16. See Kelley, Colorado Ground Water Act of
1957-Is Ground Water Property of the Public?, 31 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 165-71 (1959) for
a discussion of the Act.
169. See 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 289, §§ 2, 5-7, 10; Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 171-72,
385 P.2d 131, 139 (1963); Kelley, supra note 168, at 171.
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v. Coit7 ° that underground water not contributing to a natural stream
was not public water, therefore, not subject to the prior appropriation
doctrine.7' The court ruled that a pre-1957 adjudication of nontributary
groundwater rights was void because the lower court lacked jurisdic-
tion.'7 1 Such a ruling had the effect of making countless conditional
well decrees for nontributary groundwater suddenly unenforceable.
Colorado's 1957 law relating to nontributary groundwater was
changed by the Ground Water Management Act of 1965''1 to provide,
for the first time, management of groundwater according to a prior
appropriation permit system.""' The Act protected the priorities of those
who appropriated nontributary groundwater prior to its effective date,'
and provided that a Ground Water Commission,'76 upon application,
would grant or deny permits for new appropriations.77 Further, the
Act gave the Commission authority to designate "groundwater basins"
and determine their boundaries," and to dictate the use and conser-
vation of water within those basins.79 In reviewing the 1965 Act's permit
procedure for "designated groundwater" and its constitutionality, the
supreme court held the procedure was reasonably designed to achieve
economic development of such designated groundwater resources' and
did not prohibit or limit the constitutional right to appropriate the un-
appropriated waters of natural streams.''
An appropriator today must comply with statutory requirements for
perfecting a water right. The Water Rights Determination and Ad-
ministrative Act of 1969182 integrated the appropriation, use, and ad-
170. 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963).
171. Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 163-74, 385 P.2d 131, 134-40 (1963). See CoLO. CONST.
art. XVI, §§ 5, 6, providing that water of natural streams are public property and such waters
are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses.
172. Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 174-75, 385 P.2d 131, 140-41 (1963).
173. 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 319, §§ 1-38; CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 37-90-101 to -141 (1973
& Cum. Supp. 1982). See Moses & Vranesh, Colorado's New Ground Water Laws, 38 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 295-310 (1966) for a discussion of the Act. See also 2 LARoE, supra note 159, at 139-42.
174. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-102, -109(1) (1973); Moses & Vranesh, supra note 173, at
297, 305.
175. CoL. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-109(1), (2) (1973); Moses & Vranesh, supra note 173, at 305-06.
176. See COLO. RFev. STAT. § 37-90-104 (1973) (creation of Commission); id. § 37-90-111 (1973
& Cum. Supp. 1982) (powers of Commission).
177. CoLO. Ray. STAT. §§ 37-90-107 to -109 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
178. Id. § 37-90-106 (1973). See id. §§ 37-90-103(6), (7) (1973).
179. Id. §§ 37-90-107 to -109 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982); Larrick v. District Court, 177 Colo.
237, 240, 493 P.2d 647, 648 (1972).
180. Kuiper v. Warren, 195 Colo. 541, 580 P.2d 32, 35 (1978).
181. Id., 580 P.2d at 35-36.
182. 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 373, COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Cum.
Supp. 1982).
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ministration of groundwater83 tributary to surface water in order to
maximize the beneficial use of all the state's waters."' The legislature
recognized the existing and future use of tributary groundwater either
independently or in conjunction with surface water rights and provided
that the use of tributary groundwater may be considered as an alternate
source or supplemental source for surface water rights previously
entered.ss Seven water division engineers appointed by the state
engineer'" oversee the administration and distribution of tributary
groundwater and surface water in each division under the supervision
of the state engineer.1 7 Division engineers also have certain functions
regarding tabulation of water rights priorities. 8
The state engineer and division engineers are authorized to issue orders
and regulations'9 with respect to total or partial discontinuance of any
water diversion not applied to beneficial use or to any diversion of
water required by persons entitled to use that water under rights having
senior priorities if the diversion is causing or will cause material injury
to the senior appropriators.9 In promulgating such orders and regula-
tions, state and division engineers may not reduce a lawful diversion
unless such a reduction would increase the amount of water available
to and required by water rights having senior priorities.'9' Other areas
under control of the state and division engineers include releasing il-
legally or improperly stored water from storage; administering the move-
ment of water involved in any plan for augmentation or water use
project, ordering the installation of measuring devices, and entering
private lands to inspect the diversion, transportation, storage, and use
of water.'92
Jurisdiction over water matters arising in each water division' 93 rests
183. The Act uses the term "underground water," which is defined as that water in the un-
consolidated alluvial aquifer of sand, gravel, and other sedementary materials and all other waters
hydraulically connected to it which can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water
in that alluvial aquifer or natural stream. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103 (11) (1973).
184. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102()(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
185. Id. § 37-92-102(2)(a)-(d) (1973).
186. Id. § 37-92-202. See id. §§ 37-80-101 to -120 (powers and duties of state engineers).
187. Id. § 37-92-301 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982). See id. § 37-80-105 (1973) (providing for
supervision by the state engineer). State and division engineers administer, distribute, and regulate
water in accordance with the constitution, statutes, and written instructions and orders of the
state engineer. Id. § 37-92-501(1).
188. Id. §§ 37-92-401, -402 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
189. Id. § 37-92-502(1) (1973).
190. Id. § 37-92-502(2).
191. Id. § 37-92-102(2)(d).
192. Id. §§ 37-92-502(3)-(6).
193. The state is divided into seven water divisions. See id. § 37-92-201.
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in the water judge of the district courts' 94 of all counties situated within
each of the seven water divisions.19 A water referee appointed by the
district water judge'96 has the authority and duty to rule in the first
instance upon determinations of water rights and conditional water
rights, their amount, priority, changes, and abandonment, plans for
augmentation, and approvals of reasonable diligence in the develop-
ment of appropriations under conditional water rights.'9 Persons
desiring a determination of water rights or conditional water rights
and amounts and priorities must file an application with their division
water clerk.1 98 Following publication of the application by the water
clerk, ' 99 the referee holds a hearing to investigate the application and
statements of opposition and then makes a ruling.10° If the ruling of
the referee is protested, the water judge will conduct hearings and render
a decision confirming, modifying, reversing, or reversing and remand-
ing that ruling.20" '
The legislature has specifically vested the state engineer with broad
rule-making power for regulating tributary groundwater diversions. Well
withdrawals that are causing or will cause material injury to senior
priorities must be regulated. The engineer must predict surface flow
and groundwater levels, in addition to surface and well demands for
the coming season, in order to ensure owners of surface rights the
amount of water they would have received absent well pumping."0 '
Permits are issued by the state engineer to applicants for constructing
wells in all areas outside designated groundwater basins.203 In deciding
whether to grant applications, material injury to the vested rights of
others will be considered, and no permit will be issued unless the loca-
tion of the proposed well is 600 feet or more from an existing well. 04
This requirement is a protection against the creation of overlapping
cones of depression. The permit system is usually used after plans for
194. The supreme court designates one district court judge within each water division as the
water judge to hear all pending and new water matters in the division. The services of the water
judge are in addition to the regular duties as a district judge, but the water duties have priority
over the regular duties. Id. § 37-92-203(2).
195. Id. § 37-92-203(1). The water judge has exclusive jurisdiction over all water matters within
the division and no judge other than the one designated as the water judge can act on any water
matter in that division.
196. Id. §§ 37-92-203(4)-(6).
197. Id. § 37-92-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
198. Id. § 37-92-302(I)(a) (1973).
199. Id. § 37-92-302(3) (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
200. Id. § 37-92-302(4) (1973)
201. Id. § 37-92-304 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
202. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 78, at 36.
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augmentation of a decreed surface water right have been approved.
Wells may acquire their own priority date or they may become an alter-
nate point of diversion for the surface right and acquire the surface
right's appropriation date.2"5
The state engineer must distribute water in accordance with tabulated
priorities and at the same time he must anticipate stream conditions
and demands in order to notify well owners when they can pump. This
involves discriminating among wells based on their priority number
and the stream depletion factor.2"6 The state engineer uses the stream
depletion factor to regulate recharge control, which is absolutely
necessary for effective management of an integrated system. Stream
depletion factors describe the time effect that pumping has on a stream
and is calculated by the state engineer for use in the regulation of well
pumping in river valleys. This factor is based on a 5% volume inter-
ception rate. Thus, a 5% stream depletion factor of 20 days means
that a well will begin taking water destined for the stream at a rate
of 5% of the stream's total flow in 20 days.20 7
Permits are required under the Ground Water Management Act of
1965208 to withdraw both tributary and nontributary groundwater from
wells and to appropriate such water.209 All "designated groundwater,
' 210
which is that groundwater in a designated basin not tributary to a full
stream and not impacting on any vested water rights,21' in the state
is subject to appropriation.21 2 As noted earlier, the Act created a Ground
Water Commission2"3 and empowered it to determine "designated
groundwater basins" and designate their boundaries.2 4
Even though the groundwater in designated basins is subject to ap-
propriation, appropriators must obtain permits for its withdrawal and
use. 2  A permit application must contain the location of the proposed
205. Id. §§ 37-92-102(2)(a)-(c).
206. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 78, at 17.
207. See Kuiper v. well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 154-56, 490 P.2d 268,
286-87 (1971).
208. CoLO. Ray. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to -141 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
209. See id. §§ 37-90-107, -108, -137.
210. Designated groundwater is that which in its natural course would not be available to
and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, or groundwater in areas not adjacent
to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein groundwater withdrawals have constituted the
principal water usage for at least fifteen years preceding the date of the first hearing on the
proposed designation of the basin, and which in both cases is within the geographic boundaries
of a designated groundwater basin. Id. § 37-90-103(6) (1973). •
211. Designated groundwater, however, may impact on intermittent streams in the designated
groundwater basin.
212. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973). See id. § 37-90-107(1).
213. Id. § 37-90-104.
214. Id. § 37-90-106(1).
215. Id. § 37-90-107(1).
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well, proposed beneficial use for the water, estimated average annual
amount of water applied for in acre-feet, and estimated maximum
pumping rate in gallons per minute.' " The Commission has the power
to prohibit or limit withdrawal of water from wells when withdrawal
would cause unreasonable injury to prior appropriators in the basin,
to establish reasonable groufidwater pumping levels in a designated
basin, and to prevent withdrawals at a rate materially in excess of the
reasonably anticipated average rate of future recharge." 7 The 3-mile
test is used by the Commission as a reasonable basis for assessing the
effect of a proposed use on other uses. In using the test, a circle with
a 3-mile radius is drawn around the proposed well site, and a rate of
pumping determined that would result in a 40% depletion of the
available groundwater in that area over a period of twenty-five years.
If that rate of pumping is exceeded by the existing wells within the
circle, then the application for a permit to drill a new well is denied."8
Groundwater management districts may be created, and if they are,
all groundwater aquifers within the geographic boundaries of the district
must be designated as part of the district by the Commission.'19 The
districts assist the Commission on all matters affecting the district area,
including "enforcing commission regulations, providing data on
underground aquifers within the area, determining if commission regula-
tions are suitable for the area, and helping conserve the groundwater
for maximum beneficial use."22 0
Permits must be issued by the state engineer for constructing wells
in aquifers located in nondesignated groundwater basins, which ac-
count for about 70% of the state. One type of permit pertains to both
tributary and nontributary groundwater not in a designated ground-
water basin.' Permit applicants must provide the same information
as those applying for a well permit in designated groundwater basins.22
Another type of permit pertains to nontributary groundwater in
nondesignated groundwater basins. The amount of withdrawal will be
restricted to that unappropriated water underlying the land owned by
the applicant or owned by others, but with their consent, if the permit
is issued. Issuance of the permit must not result in material injury to
216. Id. See id. § 37-90-108 (Cum. Supp. 1982) for issuance of final permit after receipt of
conditional permit.
217. Id. §§ 37-90-111(l)(a), (b) (1973).
218. See generally Fundingsland v. Colorado Groundwater Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d
835 (1970).
219. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-118 (1973).
220. Jackson v. Colorado, 294 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (D. Colo. 1968).
221. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(1) (1973). See id. §§ 37-90-137(2), (3) (1973 & Cum. Supp.
1982) (permit issuance procedures).
222. Id. § 37-90-137(1) (1973). See supra text accompanying note 217.
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vested water rights and the minimum useful life of the bedrock aquifer
must be 100 years.
23
V. Water Ownership and Antiexport Statutes
Colorado has recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation for a
beneficial use to be the foundation upon which water rights depend. 4
All waters in or tributary to natural surface streams originating in or
flowing into Colorado, except that already appropriated,2 25 are declared
to be public property dedicated to use by the state's people and sub-
ject to appropriation and use. 6 The appropriation, use, and administra-
tion of underground waters tributary to a stream are integrated with
the use of surface water in a way as to maximize the beneficial use
of all the state's waters.227 A preference system has been established
by the constitution that provides for priority of appropriation to be
given to the person with the senior right if both are using the water
for the same purpose, but in cases of water shortage those using the
water for domestic purposes have preference over those claiming the
water for other purposes, and persons using water for agricultural pur-
poses have preference over those using it for manufacturing purposes.2
This preference, however, may not be exercised without fully com-
pensating the senior appropriator for the loss sustained by invoking
the preference.2 9
Under Colorado law, the appropriation of any surface or groundwater
outside the state is absolutely prohibited. The antiexport statute relating
to surface water provides that
for the purpose aiding and preserving unto the state . . . and
... its citizens the use of all the [surface] waters ... of this state,
which waters do not increase with the growth of population and
which are necessary for the health and prosperity of all the citizens
... and for the growth, maintenance, and general welfare of the
state, it is unlawful . . . to divert, carry or transport by . . .
223. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(4) (1973). Basically, the permit applicant must own or
control all of the land above the aquifer.
224. CoLo. CoNsT. art. XVI, §§ 5-6; Greeley & Loveland Irrig. Co. v. Farmers Pawnee Ditch
Co., 58 Colo. 462, 464, 146 P. 247, 248 (1915).
225. CoLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5.
226. Id.; CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982); Metropolitan Suburban Water
Users Ass'n .v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 187, 365 P.2d 273,
281 (1961). See CoLo. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 6, which provides that the right to divert unappropriated
water of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.
227. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
228. CoLo. CONsT. art. XVI, § 6.
229. Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 457, 264 P.2d 502, 506 (1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426-27, 94 P. 339, 340-41 (1908).
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[pipelines] ... the [surface] waters . . . of this state into any other
state for use therein.
2 30
A similar antiexport statute makes it unlawful to divert, carry, or
transport by any manner, including pipelines, groundwater, whether
tributary or nontributary to a natural stream, into any other state for
use therein.23'
The Houston Natural Gas Company, one of the co-owners of the
San Marco Pipeline Company, has attempted to use Colorado ground-
water in the proposed San Marco slurry pipeline without mounting
a direct challenge of the constitutionality of the two antiexport statutes.
Instead, the company has alleged that use of the water at the source
of the coal slurry line would itself constitute a beneficial use of the
water within the state of Colorado. As such, according to the com-
pany, no Colorado water would be leaving the state as water, but only
a product, coal slurry, would be exported from the state.232 To counter
this contention, the legislature in 1977 enacted a new statute that pro-
vided in the event of inapplicability or invalidity of any other law,
this statute would prohibit the diversion of water outside of Colorado
unless such water is credited to an interstate compact.2"1 This new statute
specifically prohibited water exportation by means of slurry pipelines
by stating that "water mixed with other substances in the process of
forming a slurry for the purpose of transporting any substance as a
suspended solid shall not be deemed to have lost its character as
water."
234
Even though Colorado has one of the most stringent antiexport
statutes, it is not alone; other western states also have various jurisdic-
tional barriers to water exportation. The four antiexport approaches
used by other western states are:
(1) prohibiting interstate water transfers, except for certain purposes;
(2) requiring specific legislative approval for all interstate transfers
of water;
(3) prohibiting interstate transfers unless the receiving state provides
for reciprocal transfer rights; and
(4) determining that the use of water for coal slurries is not a
beneficial use.
New Mexico statutes prohibit the withdrawal of groundwater from
230. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Enforcement is to be provided by
the state engineer, division engineers, and water commissioners to prevent out-of-state transfer
of water. Id. § 37-81-102.
231. Id. § 37-90-136 (1973).
232. See TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at p. 3-3.
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that state and transporting it to another state for use unless the water
will be used for the exploration and drilling of oil and gas.135 The-city
of El Paso, which is desirous of drilling wells in New Mexico and
transporting water from those wells into Texas, is currently challeng-
ing the constitutionality of this statute in a federal court.236
Oregon237 and Wyoming238 statutes prohibit the diversion of both
surface and groundwater for use outside the state for any purpose
without the specific consent of the legislature. No guidelines or criteria
have been established by which the legislature will determine whether
to grant approval for out-of-state diversions. The Wyoming constitu-
tion, however, provides that no request for an appropriation shall be
denied unless such a denial is required by the "public interest.
239
Legislative approval has been given to Energy Transportation Systems,
Inc., to appropriate 20,000 acre-feet of groundwater annually, under
certain conditions, for use in a coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming to
Louisiana.40
Idaho24' and Nebraska242 prohibit the diversion of water for use out-
side their states' boundaries unless the receiving state grants reciprocal
rights for the use of its water within the sending state. Nebraska's statute
was recently upheld by the Nebraska Supreme Court,2 43 but on appeal
to the United States Supreme Court the reciprocity requirement was
declared to violate the commerce clause244 as imposing an impermis-
sible burden on interstate commerce.24 5 The supervisor of water resources
in Washington may decline at his discretion to issue a permit for out-
of-state diversion if the receiving state's water laws do not grant
reciprocal rights.246 Nevada will not deny an out-of-state appropria-
tion to a state having reciprocal water transfer rights.247
Montana and Oklahoma prohibit the use of water for transporting
coal slurry to any destination. Montana declares that the use of water
for slurry transport of coal is not a beneficial use of water, whether
235. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-12-19 (1978).
236. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 80-730 (D.N.M. filed Sept. 5, 1980).
237. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.810 (1981).
238. Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-3-105, -115(d) (1977). See TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at pp. 3-8 to
3-11 for a discussion of the Wyoming antiexport statutes.
239. Wyo. Co NsT. art. VIII, § 3.
240. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-115(d) (1977).
241. IDAHO CODE § 42-408 (1977).
242. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
243. State ex rel. Douglas v, Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 709-10, 305 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981).
244. U.S. CoNrs. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
245. Sporbase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
246. WAsH. REV. CODE § 90.03.300 (1963).
247. NEV. REv. STAT. § 533.515(l) (1979).
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the destination is within the state or out of state.2"" Coal slurry pipeline
companies have eminent domain powers in Oklahoma,"9 but no water
from any source within the state may be used to transport coal in slurry
form either within or through the state.250
South Dakota has taken a somewhat diffei'ent approach to the
possibility of interstate water use for coal slurry pipelines.2", Rights
may be granted to use South Dakota water within the boundaries of
any adjoining state if that state in which the water is used allows
equivalent use of its waters within South Dakota.2"2 In addition,
legislative approval must be given for all proposed appropriations in-
volving more than 10,000 acre-feet of water per year.2"3 There are no
guidelines for the legislature to use in deciding whether to approve an
appropriation; in theory at least, in-state and out-of-state diversions
are treated similarly.
The Utah statute regarding the export of state water is the most
liberal.25' It has modified its statute to make it more permissive with
respect to out of state diversions. Under the prior law, any appropria-
tion of water to be used out of state from intrastate streams was limited
to use in bordering states and only in those states that reciprocally per-
mitted use of their state's water in Utah.2"' The new law allows the
state engineer to grant applications for out-of-state use with the gover-
nor's consent, regardless of the receiving state's policies.256
VI. Colorado's Asserted Dominion Over. Waters
The basic issue common to interstate transfers of water is whether
the state in which the diversion is made can assert such dominion over
the water source as to prohibit its delivery in interstate commerce. With
regard to the San Marco Pipeline, the question is whether Colorado
has sovereignty over the waters within its boundaries or whether the
federal government has jurisdiction over how and when water may be
owned or regulated. Colorado's declaration of sovereignty has never
been successfully challenged.
248. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104(2) (1979).
249. 27 OIaA. STAT. § 7.1 (1981).
250. 27 OKLA. STAT. § 7.6 (1981).
251. See TEKNEKRON, supra note 32, at pp. 3-18 to 3-21 for discussion of South Dakota anti-
export provisions.
252. S.D. COD. LAws ANN. § 46-1-13 (Int. Supp. 1982).
253. Id. § 46-5-20.1.
254. For a discussion of Utah statutes on out-of-state use of water, see TEKNEKRON, supra
note 32, at pp. 3-13 to 3-16.
255. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (Supp. 1977).
256. 1979 Utah Laws ch. 246, codified in UTH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (1980).
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State's Asserted Dominion Over Waters
Colorado claims proprietary rights in its water through its constitu-
tion and admission into the Union. All unappropriated waters of natural
streams in Colorado are declared in the constitution to be public prop-
erty and dedicated to the use of the people of the state.257 Colorado
contends that when a state was admitted to the Union with a constitu-
tion containing such language the federal government surrendered any
rights it was given to such waters either expressly or impliedly by Con-
gress. If a state was admitted to the Union by an act.of Congress and
that enabling act authorized the state to acquire proprietary rights in
the waters within its boundaries, the act would repeal or amend any
prior inconsistent congressional egislation and the enabling act or act
of admission would constitute an express grant.258 However, Colorado
was admitted to the Union under an enabling act authorizing the Presi-
dent to admit states to the Union by proclamation upon its adoption
of a constitution containing a variety of specified provisions.259 Under
this enabling act Congress did not review the state constitution and
did not ratify any provisions in it. Therefore, the Colorado constitu-
tion was never reviewed by Congress upon the state's admission to
the Union. 260
Even though Colorado was admitted to the Union by proclamation
and its constitutional provision on water261 Was not reviewed by Con-
gress, the Colorado Supreme Court nonetheless held that the admis-
sion of the state into the Union with the dedication of waters to the
people of the state in the constitution amounted to a recognition by
Congress of state ownership of water resources.262 This declaration still
stands today in Colorado.263 However, the Colorado Supreme Court
257. CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
258. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623 (1881). Montana and Wyoming were ad-
mitted to the Union under such acts. See Act of Admission, 26 Stat. 222 (1890) (Wyoming's
admission).
259. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 139, 18 Stat., pt. 3, 474 (1875) (admission of Colorado).
New Mexico and Utah were admitted in a similar manner.
260. Martz & Grazis, supra note 18, at 47. See id. at 46-49 for further discussion.
261. CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
262. Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 29, 129 P. 220, 222 (1912), which stated:
Ve therefore find it to be not only that our state Constitution and pertinent statutes,
but the decisions of the courts and duly announced public policy, all are in accord
on the proposition to which the federal government has ... given its consent that
the waters of natural streams of this state belong to the people, to the state, in
its sovereign capacity, and that its right to their distribution and control within
its borders is free from any interference by any other sovereignty.
See also Bowers v. McFadzean, 82 Colo. 138, 142, 257 P. 361, 363 (1927). See generally Trelease,
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 638 (1957).
263. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1978).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
in United States v. District Court2 64 cast some doubt on the validity
of that declaration when it recognized the possibility that its former
decision in Stockman v. Leddy2 61 had been overruled by the United
States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California.26 6 The Colorado court
deferred a decision in District Court on the matter until a particular
case, involving a federal reservation after statehood, should come
before it.267
The federal government has two interests that may prompt it to ex-
ercise its authority over western water. One interest of the United States
is that of a sovereign entity exercising its constitutional power and the
other interest is that of the United States as the proprietor of vast areas
of western land. Despite its own interests in western waters, the federal
government silently acquiesced to and subordinated its interests to state
and local appropriation laws until the last half of the nineteenth
century.2 68 In the Mining Act of 1866269 the federal government affir-
matively recognized and confirmed the preexisting water rights that
had been established on the public land according to local customs
and state laws. 270 That Act was not itself a grant of water rights pur-
suant to federal law, but was a voluntary recognition of a preexisting
right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use."'
The United States Supreme Court considered the 1866 Act to foreclose
all further proprietary objection by the federal government to appropria-
tions that rested upon local custom.
272
The Desert Land Act of 1877 gave further grounds for the western
264. 169 Colo. 555, 458 P.2d 760 (1969).
265. 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912).
266. 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963). See United States v. District Court, 169 Colo. 555, 572-77,
458 P.2d 760, 768-71 (1969).
267. United States v. District Court, 169 Colo. 555, 577, 458 P.2d 760, 770-71 (1969).
268. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
269. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 253 (1868), codified in 42 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
270. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978). Because of the fear that the Mining
Act of 1866 might in some way interfere with the water rights and systems that had grown up
under state law and local laws, Congress explicitly recognized and acknowledged the local law.
See Martz & Grazis, supra note 18, *at 45.
271. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 705 (1899). In the Mining
Act of 1870, Congress reaffirmed that occupants of federal public land would be bound by state
water law by providing that all patents granted or preemption or homesteads allowed would
be subject to any vested and accrued water rights. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 218
(1871), codified in 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976). The effect of the 1866 and 1870 acts were not limited
to rights previously acquired; they reached into the future and approached and confirmed the
policy of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the
legislation and judicial decisions of the arid states, as the test and measure of private rights
in and to nonnavigable waters on the public domain. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155 (1935).
272. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 748 (1950). See Broder v. Water
Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
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states to claim sovereignty over the waters within their boundaries.
2 73
Entry upon and reclamation of desert lands within certain western states
and territories was allowed under the Act, provided that the use of
water by a claimant would depend upon bona fide appropriation under
the laws of the states and territories. Individuals had the right to ap-
propriate unappropriated waters pursuant to their state's laws. Water
not appropriated by the claimant could be appropriated by the public
for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to existing
rights.274 The United States Supreme Court has not held that the Desert
Land Act effected a grant of proprietary rights in water to the states
or to the people subject to irrevocable state control, but has held that
the Act "effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain,
not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.' 275 "[A]ll non-
navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publicijuris,
subject to the plenary control of the designated states. .. . The
states and territories would govern the use of this water and would
be free to adopt either prior appropriation or riparian water rights.277
Federal recognition of the appropriation doctrine was also contained
in the Reclamation Act of 1902,271 which stated that federally sponsored
reclamation projects would not affect or interfere with any state laws
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used
in irrigation or any vested rights acquired or any rights of states or
appropriators of water.2 79 In California v. United States280 the Supreme
Court held that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, when impounding
water for a water project, must comply with any state-imposed con-
ditions not inconsistent with specific congressional directives.28 ' In draw-
273. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-29 (1976).
274. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
275. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935).
The effect was to separate water from land to the end that water rights would not pass to patentees
as appurtenances to their patents, but would thereafter vest in users pursuant to the laws of
respective states.
276. Id. at 163-64. See also California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 658 (1978).
277. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 (1935).
278. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1903), codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616w
(1976).
279. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (1903), codified in 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
See Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 480, which stated that even the Reclamation Act
"carried forward the policy of recognizing the territorial laws as the sources of water rights,
clearly providing that state water law would control the appropriation and later distribution of
water."
280. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
281. Id. at 672. In this case the state of California sought reversal of a declaratory judgment
giving the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation the right to impound whatever unappropriated water
it found necessary for a reclamation project, without regard to state law. Id. at 647. The state
had issued the desired permits, but with 25 attached conditions, including one that required a
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ing this conclusion, the Supreme Court conducted a thorough investiga-
tion of the Reclamation Act and found it to embody a spirit of coopera-
tion between state and federal governments.8 2 Specifically, the sav-
ings clause of the Act"83 was found to constitute a clear expression
of congressional intent to defer to the substance, as well as the form,
of state water law. 8"' Although California v. United States expressly
addressed only reclamation cases, it indicated a newly found respect
for all water savings clauses.2 s The policy of the federal government
under this Act and the Mining8" and Desert287 acts has been to en-
courage development of water resources by state water users.88
The western states, in governing the use and distribution of water
rights, draw some support from their compact power, which is the power
to enter into agreements with sister states regarding the allocation of
water among the states, and from the states' right or duty of parens
patriae by which they represent heir citizens in litigation or otherwise
in the protection of their common interests.8 9 States rely primarily,
however, on their reserved powers under the tenth amendment to the
United States Constitution to regulate private water rights.290 That
amendment states that the "powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."' 29' States draw their police
power from this amendment to protect the public health, safety, and
general welfare of their citizens and their power to create property rights;
thus, we have state-created water rights.292
Federal Asserted Dominion Over Waters
The federal government is a government of delegated powers. The
Constitution gives it powers to regulate interstate commerce, naviga-
tion, and spending, to manage federal property, to make war and pro-
vide for the common defense, to approve treaties, and to promote the
showing of specific plans for the beneficial use of water. Id. at 652-53. In western states, beneficial
use is often described as the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to use water, and
statutes generally list approved uses according to preference. See Trealease, The Concept of
Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1957).
282. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978).
283. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (1903), codified in 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
284. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 675 (1978).
285. See Webber, supra note 22, at 780.
286. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1868), codified in 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
287. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-329 (1976).
288. Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 480-81.
289. See Martz & Grazis, supra note 18, at 50-54.
290. U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
291. Id.
292. 3 HUTCHINS, supra note 125, at 2.
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general welfare of the nation. One or more of these powers and related
constitutional provisions have been used to justify various aspects of
water regulation or water resource development by the federal
government.293 In evaluating the validity of Colorado's antiexport
statutes, it is important to review the areas of federal sovereignty over
certain waters that have been exercised or specifically carved out by
Congress and the courts.
Federal dominion over the navigable waters of the United States is
the most clearly defined area of federal sovereignty and this was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden.29" The Federal
Power Act draws upon this federal power and illustrates its breadth.
295
Judicial interpretation of the Federal Power Act further suggests that
other powers of the federal government are equally strong and may
sustain federal action over state objectives.2 96
In First Iowa HydroZElectric Cooperative v. Federal Power Com-
mission,297 the Supreme Court addressed the issue whether a diversion
from a navigable stream could be licensed pursuant to the Federal Power
Act without first obtaining a state water permit.298 The Supreme Court
held that the Federal Power Act overrode conflicting state law,299 that
state prohibitions against diversions of water outside of its natural water-
shed were preempted by the Act,30 and that compliance with state law
was only one factor to be considered in acting upon license applica-
tions."' As a result of this decision, the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction over the navigable rivers of the United States, although
state laws would remain applicable to other waters and matters in the
state:
The [Federal Power] Act leaves to the States their traditional
jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal
Government, through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, administer the public lands and reservations of the
United States and, in certain cases, exercise authority under the
293. Id.
294. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
295. Federal Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1921), codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c
(1976).
296. See Webber, supra note 22, at 777.
297. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
298. Id. at- 163-64. Applicants for federal licenses are required under the Act to provide satisfac-
tory evidence of compliance with state law. 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1976).
299. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 181 (1946).
300. Id. at 171.
301. Id. at 178. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 452 (1955), which held
federal licensees need not obtain a state permit to construct a dam across nonnavigable waters
on federal land.
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treaties of the United States. These sources of constitutional power
are all applied in the Federal Power Act to the development of
the navigable waters of the United States."2
The Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928,303 which authorized the
United States to construct a dam, storage reservoir, and hydroelectric
plant on the Colorado River at Black Canyon and provided that the
federal government control, manage, and operate such facilities, also
drew on the federal government's power to control navigable waters.0
In Arizona v. California3°1 Arizona asserted control over both the water
rights and the entire Hoover Dam, which was being constructed pur-
suant to the Act, and required written approval of plans and specifica-
tions from the state engineer prior to construction of any dam, even
those erected by the United States.3 6 The Supreme Court found:
The United States may perform its functions without conform-
ing to the police regulations of a State .... If Congress has power
to authorize the construction of the dam and reservoir, . . . [the
Secretary of the Interior] is under no obligation to submit the plans
and specifications to the State Engineer for approval. And the
Federal Government has the power to create this obstruction in
the river for the purpose of improving navigation if the Colorado
River is navigable.30
7
[T]he fact that purposes other than navigation will also be served
could not invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred, even
if those other purposes would not alone have justified an exercise
of Congressional Power.0
8
In a subsequent case, Arizona v. California.,0 9 the Supreme Court
again upheld the validity of federal action under the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, stating that the Act was passed "in the exercise of con-
gressional power to control navigable water for purposes of flood con-
302. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop: v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 171-72 (1946).
303. Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
304. 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976). The purpose of the Act was to control floods, improve naviga-
tion, and regulate the flow of the Colorado River and to provide for the storage and delivery
of the stored waters for reclamation of public lands and other beneficial uses and for generation
of electrical energy.
305. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
306. See 1929 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 102, §§ 1-17, codified in ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-701
to -716 (1956 & Cum. Supp. 1981-82).
307. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 451-52 (1931).
308. Id. at 456.
309. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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trol, navigation, power generation, and other objects.... 3 ,0 Further,
the Act "is equally sustained by the power of Congress to promote
the general welfare through projects for reclamation, irrigation, or other
internal improvements."3 ' In concluding that state law did not con-
trol the apportionment of water in the Colorado River, the Court stated
that where the federal government, as here, "has exercised this power
and undertaken a comprehensive project for the improvement of a great
river and for the orderly and beneficial distribution of water, there
is no room for inconsistent state laws.' 11 2 The savings clause in the
Act was held only to allow states to do things not inconsistent with
the Act."'
Some believe that after First Iowa Hydro-Electric' " and Arizona
v. California," state water law savings provisions drafted for proposed
coal pipeline legislation will prove ineffective in the courts"6 and that
Congress can effectively authorize the diversion of any water supply
in the United States, whether it be navigable or nonnavigable, surface
or ground water, pure or polluted, despite anything contrary in state
laws. Those decisions, however, involved direct confrontation between
state laws and express congressional directives to regulate water.3" 7 The
Boulder Canyon Project Act did delegate to the Secretary of the In-
terior power to create a reservoir and diversion works"' and to create
water rights in states and water users to the impounded water.3"9 The
logical extension of the holding in Arizona v. California32 interpreting
310. Id. at 587.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 587-88. See 3 HuTcmNbs, supra note 125, at 26-27.
314. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
315. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
316. During hearings on H.R. 1609, the coal pipeline legislation defeated in 1978, Wyoming
Governor Herschler testified that while he appreciated congressional attempts to protect state
water law, "in light of various court decisions, I doubt that there is any language that could
guarantee the retention of State authority." Coal Pipeline Act Hearings, supra note 10, at 42.
While federal power over water resources is almost without limit, Congress has regularly incor-
porated state water law savings clauses in federal legislation affecting water resources. PUBLIC
LAND LAW REVIEW COiAISSION, supra note 19, at 141.
317. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 588 (1963) (congressional directive to distribute pro-
ject water); First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 180 n.23
(1946) (federal directive to develop water power).
318. 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976).
319. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 617b-617e, 617g, 617h (1976). See id. § 617q, which provides, however,
that nothing in the Act should be construed as interfering with such rights as the states had
on December 21, 1928, either to the waters within their borders or to adopt such policies and
enact such laws as they deem necessary with respect to appropriation, control, and use of waters
within their borders, except as modified by the Colorado River Compact or other interstate
agreements.
320. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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the Act is that the federal government has the ultimate say over inter-
state resources. States cannot forbid the export of water when it is
specifically authorized by Congress.2 '
Another large area of federal rights over western waters is sanctioned
by the reserved rights doctrine. This doctrine states that whenever the
federal government reserves land by withdrawing a parcel of its land
from the public domain for a specified purpose, such as a national
forest or an Indian reservation, the government by implication reserves
enough of the unappropriated water to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation. In the past, the federal government has asserted that it
can expand these reserved rights for new uses on the public land and
that the priority of its rights would date back to the original reserva-
tion of the land.32 2 However, in United States v. New Mexico,"3 the
Supreme Court generally recognized congressional deference to state
water law32' and held that under the reserved rights doctrine the federal
government is entitled only to water necessary to the specific purposes
for which the land was originally taken.32 Although Congress originally
established the national forests only to secure favorable water flow
and to preserve timber," ' subsequent legislation has expressly decided
that national, forests be administered for recreational and wildlife
purposes. 27 Consequently, the Supreme Court found that in the absence
of a positive indication that additional water be reserved, state law
controls.3 28 This narrow limitation on the amount of water reserved
was based on "Congress' principled deference to state water law."
'3 29
No rights will be implied under the reserved rights doctrine where the
water is to be used for a secondary purpose or use.330 Even with this
assurance, the indefinite quantity of federal reserved rights is a hard-
321. See generally Corker, Can a State Embargo the Export of Water by Transbasin Diver-
sions?, 12 IDAHO L. REv. 135, 137-46 (1976).
322. See generally Tarlock, supra note 72, at 530-38; Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112,
at 449-89; Boles, Jr., & Elliott, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal Reserved
Water Rights, 51 U. CoLo. L. REV. 209 (1980); Muys, Comments on "Federal Reserved Water
Rights," 54 DEN. L.J. 493, 493-98 (1977); Trelease, Federal Reserved Rights Since PLLRC, 54
DEN. L.J. 473, 475-78 (1977), for ftirther discussion on the reserved right doctrine.
323. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
324. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
325. Id. at 702. The state engineer rejected federal claims for sufficient water for recreation
and stock-watering purposes in the stream adjudication of a river originating in a national forest.
Id. at 698.
326. Id. at 718. See Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34 (1897), codified
in 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976).
327. See Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, § 1, 74 Stat. 215
(1960), codified in 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
328. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 717 (1978).
329. Id. at 718.
330. See L. MALL, PUBLIc LAND AND Mmno LAW 156 (1981).
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ship on state water administration and on water users who may sud-
denly have their state-adjudicated rights impaired by the federal govern-
ment exercising dormant reserved rights.3 '
State and federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
reserved water rights. The McCarran Amendment, enacted by Con-
gress in 1952, consented to joinder of the United States as a party
in general water rights adjudication.32 The United States Supreme Court
held in'Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States 
33
that the McCarran Amendment extended to Indian reseived rights and
evoked a clear federal policy to avoid piecemeal adjhdication of water
rights in a river system when comprehensive state systems for adjudica-
tion of water rights are available.34
The federal government has established broad powers over the
navigable waters of the United States. It also has access to western
water sources through the reserved rights doctrine. The extent of power
the federal government may exercise in regard to nonnavigable water
is still undecided. The area of greatest debate, however, involves the
implications that the commerce clause in the United States Constitu-
tion has on such waters. In the absence of federal legislation in this
area, what powers do states have to regulate interstate water transfers?
This is the heart of the coal slurry water controversy.
VII. Constitutionality of Antiexport Statutes Under Commerce Clause
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states." 335
It is an affirmative grant of power, but the Supreme Court has long
recognized that it also contains an implicit prohibition against state
regulation of interstate commerce. Although the Supreme Court over
the years has taken various approaches to defining the precise scope
of the prohibition, it has consistently ruled that economic protectionist
legislation is invalid under the commerce clause.336
The United States Supreme Court has considered the validity of a
state prohibition against the exportation of water under the commerce
clause three times. The earliest case, Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter,3" sustained the constitutionality of a New Jersey antiexport
331. Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 478-79.
332. Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 495, § 208(a)-(d), 66 Stat. 560 (1952), codified in
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976) (also known as the McCarren Water Rights Suit Act).
333. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
334. Id. at 819.
335. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
336. The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 57 (1978).
337. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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statute33 forbidding the export of surface water from the Passaic River
in New Jersey to Staten Island, New York, for domestic use.39 In a
later case, City ofAltus v. Carr,"0 the Supreme Court affirmed a federal
district court decision that restrained the state of Texas from obstruct-
ing deliveries of Texas groundwater to customers in Oklahoma on the
basis that the owner of an article of commerce can transport it in inter-
state commerce.3 ' The most recent case, Sporhase v. Nebraska,14 held
groundwater to be an article of commerce and therefore subject to
congressional regulation.4 3 Sporhase also held that the reciprocity
requirement in a Nebraska statute that prohibits transporting ground-
water for use in another state without the receiving state granting
reciprocal rights providing for transfer of groundwater from that state
into Nebraska violated the commerce clause as imposing an impermis-
sible burden on interstate commerce.3" A close examination of these
cases is necessary to understand the impact they might have in a suit
challenging Colorado's antiexport statutes.
Justice Holmes, who wrote the majority opinion in Hudson County,3 45
holding that New Jersey could protect its natural advantages by pro-
hibiting the export of water to New York, stated:
[Ilt is recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign and represen-
tative of the interests of the public has a standing in court to pro-
tect the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory,
irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the
land most immediately concerned.4 6
lIlt appears to us that few public interests are more obvious,
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest
of the public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within
it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as
the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of
338. 1905 N.J. Laws ch. 238, repealed 1965 N.J. Laws ch. 262, § 26. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:IA-5 (West 1982).
339. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353, 356-57 (1908).
340. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
341. Id. at 340. A Te:as statute forbidding exportation of Texas groundwater without legislative
consent was invalidated because water was found by the court to be an article of commerce
and as such the Texas law discriminated against interstate commerce. Id.
342. 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
343. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3463 (1982). The Nebraska Supreme Court found
that groundwater was not a commodity. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 705, 305 N.W.2d
614, 616 (1981).
344. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3467 (1982).
345. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353 (1908).
346. Id. at 355.
[Vol. 36:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/28
1983] INTERSTATE TRANSFER OF COLORADO WATER 43
turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is omni-
present wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows 47
We are of opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the
State to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired
by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the ex-
tent of present use or speculation as to future needs.
3 48
The right to receive water from a river through pipes is subject
to territorial limits by nature, and those limits may be fixed by
the State within which the river flows, even if they are made to
coincide with the state line. 49
The Hudson County decision appears to be precise, but it can be
distinguished from future cases involving challenges of a state's anti-
export statute. First, the case is more than seventy years old and was
decided many years before the fulrdevelopment of the interstate com-
merce powers of the federal government. One recent development in
commerce clause law that directly affects the Hudson County decision
is the Supreme Court's overruling of Geer v. Connecticut350 in Hughes
v. Oklahoma.351 Hudson County relied on Geer's preservation rationale
as well as on Geer's holding that a- state might qualify the property
interest one receives in a resource to prevent it from becoming an ob-
ject of interstate commerce."12 The Supreme Court In Hughes rejected
the proposition that state ownership of things ferae naturae was a suf-
ficient basis for a state to prefer its citizens to those of other states
and held that such statutes will be subject to scrutiny under the com-
merce clause. Under the modern standard of scrutiny, the statute will
be upheld only if it "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental,... unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
347. Id. at 356.
348. Id. at 356-57.
349. Id. at 357.
350. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
351. 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979), wherein an Oklahoma statute that prohibited transporting out
of the state for sale live minnows procured from waters within the state, was held unconstitu-
tional on its face because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held
that a state may promote the legitimate purpose of protecting and conserving wild animal life,
but only in ways consistent with promoting a national economic unit. When a wild animal becomes
an article of commerce, its use cannot be limited to the citizens of one state to the exclusion
of citizens of another state. Id. at 338-39.
352. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908). See Geer v. Con-
necticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-35 (1896). See generally Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court,
The Commerce Clause, and State Controls of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. Rav. 51, 90-91.
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excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'" 3"3 Another impor-
tant consideration when assessing the precedential value of Hudson
County is that the case involved a controversy between two riparian
doctrine states, New Jersey and New York, and may not be readily
applicable to prior appropriation doctrine states because the fundamental
theories of water law are so different.
A comparison of how each court in Hudson County and City of
Altus v. Carr3"' considered the nature of water is extremely important
to an evaluation of Colorado's antiexport statutes. In Hudson County
water was not considered to be an article of commerce. This was not
expressed directly in the opinion, but, in a subsequent dissenting opinion
in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,"' Justice Holmes expressed his belief
that water was not an article of commerce and therefore was not
deserving of commerce clause protection." ' In City of Altus, however,
the three-judge district court decision, which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court without opinion,357 followed the rationale of the natural
gas cases3s8 and assumed that water was similarly a commodity of inter-
state commerce.59
One of the cases most relied on by the district court judges in City
of Altus was West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,360 involving an Oklahoma
statute that denied the right of eminent domain and the right to use
the highways of the state for the transportation of natural gas. 6 The
statute's effect was to deny the owners of natural gas the right to sell
the gas outside of the state.62 The statute was held invalid under the
commerce clause,3 3 and the Supreme Court stated:
Gas, when reduced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to
the owner of the land, and, when reduced to possession, is his in-
dividual property subject to sale by him, and may be a subject
of intrastate commerce and interstate commerce.364
353. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
354. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
355. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
356. Id. at 602-03 (dissenting opifiion). See McDaniel, supra note 14, at 538.
357. Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U.S. 35 (1966) (mem.).
358. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
359. City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 837-40 (W.D. Tex. 1966), wherein a Texas
statute prohibiting the diversion of underground water for export and use in any other state
unless such diversion was specifically authorized by the legislature was held to be unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause.
360. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
361. 1907 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 67, §§ 1-13.
362. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 254-55 (1911).
363. Id. at 262.
364. Id. at 255.
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[I]t is not necessary to cite cases to show that the right to engage
in interstate commerce is not the gift of a State, and that it cannot
be regulated or restrained by a State, or that a State cannot ex-
clude from its limits a corporation engaged in such commerce.
3 6
1
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. distinguished Hudson County at length
in determining that gas was subject to commerce clause protection .3
The district court in City of Altus held that the general law of Texas
recognizes water withdrawn from underground sources to be personal
property subject to sale and commerce.367 The court discussed the states'
ability to interfere or regulate interstate commerce as follows:
By virtue of the Commerce Clause, the Congress of these United
States was specifically granted the power to regulate commerce
among the several states, and the states may not unreasonably
burden or interfere with interstate commerce. This is not to say
that a state may not, in the absence of conflicting legislation by
Congress, make laws governing matters of local concern which may
in some measure affect interstate commerce, or even, to some ex-
tent, regulate it. [Citation omitted.] Rather, it means that a state
may not enact a law which imposes a direct burden on interstate
commerce or discriminates against interstate commerce. [Citations
omitted.] In the recent case of Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, [citation omitted] an undue or unreasonable burden
was defined as one which materially affects interstate commerce
where uniformity of regulation is necessary.
3"8
Considering the statute in question only with regard to whether
it regulates the transportation and use of water after it has been
withdrawn from a well and becomes personal property, such statute
constitutes an unreasonable burden upon and interference with in-
terstate commerce. Moreover, on the facts of this case it appears
... [the statute] does not have for its purpose, nor does it operate
to conserve water resources of the State of Texas except in the
sense that it does so for her own benefit to the detriment of her
sister States .... In the name of conservation, the statute seeks
to prohibit interstate shipments of water while indulging in the
substantial discrimination of permitting the unrestricted intrastate
production and transportation of water between points within the
State, no matter how distant; ... [T]he statute had little relation
to the cause of conservation.
3 69
365. Id. at 260.
366. Id. at 258.
367. City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 840 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
368. Id. at 837.
369. Id. at 839-40.
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Texas is unique in its recognition of subterranean water as being
absolutely owned as personal property by the overlying landowner once
such landowner removes it from the ground.370 Other western states
consider a citizen's "right to use" the surface or underground waters
of the state as being a real property interest subject to conditions
necessary to make and maintain a legal appropriation."' For this reason,
City of Altus may be distinguished from similar controversies involv-
ing other prior appropriation doctrine states.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Sporhase3" distinguished
City of Altus on precisely those grounds.3 73 Nebraska's statute pro-
hibiting an appropriator from transferring groundwater outside the
state374 was held constitutional.375 Permits to withdraw groundwater
from state wells and transport that water to an adjoining state are
granted if the director of the Department of Water Resources deter-
mines that the transfer of water is: (1) reasonable, (2) not contrary
to the conservation and use of groundwater, and (3) not otherwise
detrimental to public welfare, and (4) that the receiving state grants
reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport water to Nebraska.37 6 This
permit system follows the spirit of the Nebraska constitution, which
declares water for irrigation purposes in the state to be a natural want.3"
Sporhase held that the legislature is able to determine the policy of
the state as to underground waters and the rights of persons in their
use.378 The court found that neither the Nebraska courts nor the
legislature had ever considered groundwater to be an article of com-
merce. Water is not a market item freely transferable because the
Nebraska public may limit or deny the right of private parties to use
the water freely when it determines that the welfare of the state and
its citizens is at stake.7 9 The court found that even where it appears
that water itself is being marketed, as in municipal water supply ar-
rangements, it is the value of the cost of distributing the water that
is the basis for the rate structure and not the value of the water itself."
Sporhase refused to find that City of Altus overruled Hudson
370. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927); 2 HoTcmns, supra note 151, at 746.
371. See 2 HUTCmNS, supra note 151, at 631-53.
372. 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
373. Id. at 708-09, 305 N.W.2d at 618.
374. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
375. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 712, 305 N.W.2d 614, 620 (1981).
376. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
377. NEB. CoNST. art. XV, § 4. See Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb.
783, 799, 140 N.W.2d 626, 636 (1966).
378. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 706-07, 305 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1981).
379. Id. at 707-08, 305 N.W.2d at 618.
380. Id. at 708, 305 N.W.2d at 618.
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County38' and held that City of Altus was limited to its facts alone.2
The Nebraska court held that a state may, under its police power, for-
bid or condition the interstate transfer of its water resources without
running afoul of the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution."" It also distinguished the decisions in other cases which
limited the rights of individual states to condition interstate transfers
of natural resources38'4 by holding that the natural resources dealt with
in those cases have "historically been market items, reducible to private
possession and freely exchanged for value. ' 385 In emphasizing that
underground water in Nebraska is not a market item, the court stated:
[S]ince water is the only natural resource absolutely essential to
human survival, the application of rules designed to facilitate com-
merce in less essential resources to the transfer of water must be
done, if at all, with extreme caution. It is this caution which
prevents us from holding Nebraska groundwater is an article of
commerce. Because the groundwater in this case is not an article
of commerce, the commerce clause considerations do not apply
to the Nebraska statute at issue here.
38'
Groundwater has now been established by the United States Supreme
Court to be an article of commerce and subject to the commerce
clause.387 Sporhase appealed the Nebraska Supreme Court decision to
the United States Supreme Court (Sporhase v' Nebraska),388 challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the statutory restriction on the withdrawal
of groundwater from any well within Nebraska intended for use in
an adjoining state.389 One question presented by the challenge was
whether groundwater is an article of commerce and therefore subject
to congressional regulation under the commerce clause.390 In holding
that groundwater is an article of commerce, the Supreme Court stated
that Nebraska's claim that its "groundwater is not an article of com-
merce goes too far; it would not only exempt Nebraska groundwater
381. Hudson County water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
382. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 709, 305 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1981).
383. Id.
384. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 533 (1923) (natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural
gas).
385. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 709-10, 305 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981).
386. Id. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619. See Korb, Environmental Law, State ex reL Douglas
v. Sporhase: Public Ownership of Ground Water, 15 CREGHTON L. REV. 263-71 (1981) for further
discussion of the Sporhase case.
387. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3463 (1982).
388. 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
389. Id. at 3457. See NEB. R v. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
390. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3457 (1982).
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regulation from burden-on-commerce analysis, it also would curtail the
affirmative power of Congress to implement its own policies concern-
ing such regulation."39' The Court rejected Nebraska's claim that state
ownership of groundwater would exempt it from commerce clause
scrutiny.392 In agreeing that states are vitally interested in conserving
and preserving scarce water resources, the Court said that the "states'
interests clearly have an interstate dimension. ' 39 3 Continuing, the Court
stated that "the multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer ... con-
firms the view that there is a significant federal interest in conserva-
tion as well as in fair allocation of this diminishing [groundwater]
resource.... Ground water overdraft is a national problem and Con-
gress has the power to deal with it on that scale. ' 394
The controversy over whether antiexport statutes are constitutional
under the commerce clause remains unresolved and will depend upon
the nature of the restrictions and affected rights. Hughes v. Oklahoma39
best sets forth the standard for considering constitutionality under the
commerce clause:
Under the general rule, we must inquire: (1) whether the challenged
statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce
either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves
a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating
against interstate commerce. The burden to show discrimination
rests on the party challenging the validity of the statute, but "when
discrimination against commerce ... is demonstrated, the burden
falls on the state to justify it both in terms of the local benefits
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of non-discrimina-
tory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."' 396
The United States Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,397
which held that solid waste was an article of commerce, noted that
the opinions of the Court have "reflected an alertness to the evils of
'economic isolationism' and protectionism. ' 39 1 It held that under the
commerce clause "the crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to
determining whether . . . [state legislation] is basically a protectionist
391. Id. at 3463. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978).
392. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3463 (1982).
393. Id. at 3462.
394. Id. at 3463.
395. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
396. Id. at 336. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Adv. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
397. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
398. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
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measure or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental.'" 99 Although protectionist legislation is not looked upon
favorably, the Supreme Court has sustained such state regulations to
promote the conservation of wildlife and game.400
Two other questions presented on Sporhase's appeal to the United
States Supreme Court of the Nebraska Supreme Court decision401 on
the constitutionality of that state's antiexport statute relating to ground-
water were whether the restriction on interstate transfer of ground-
water imposed an impermissible burden on commerce and whether Con-
gress granted the states permission to engage in grcundwater regula-
tion that otherwise would be impermissible.40 2 The Supreme Court
recognized a state's interest in conserving and preserving its own scarce
and diminishing groundwater resources403 and stated that such a pur-
pose is unquestionably legitimate and important.0 4 Nebraska's ground-
water regulations demonstrated the state's genuine concern in that strict
regulations are imposed on all groundwater withdrawal and use and
intrastate transfers, of groundwater are only permitted between lands
controlled by the same groundwater user.05
The Court said that Nebraska's interest in conservation and preser-
vation of groundwater was advanced by the first three conditions in
the statute for the withdrawal of groundwater for an interstate
transfer. 6 Although commerce clause concerns are implicated by the
fact that the statute applies to interstate transfers but not to intrastate
transfers, there are legitimate reasons, according to the Court, for the
special treatment accorded requests to transport groundwater across
state lines. "Obviously a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use
restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate
commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water
out of the State. An exemption for interstate transfers would be in-
consistent with the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation."47 The three
399. Id. at 624.
400. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
401. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
402. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3457 (1982).
403. Id. at 3462.
404. Id. at 3463. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188
(1950) ("Insofar as conservation is concerned, the national interest and theinterest of producing
states may well tend to coincide.").
405. See Nebraska Ground Water Management Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-656 to 46-674 (1978).
406. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3464 (1982). Those requirements are "that the
withdrawal of groundwater requested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use
of groundwater, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 46-613.01 (1978).
407. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3464 (1982).
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statutory standards imposed on Sporhase are no more-strict, accord-
ing to the Court, than the limitations imposed on intrastate transfers.
A fourth requirement in the Nebraska statute that "the state in which
the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport
groundwater from that state for use in the state of Nebraska"4 8 was
held to be unconstitutional."9 Because Colorado forbids the exporta-
tion of its groundwater,410 the reciprocity provision operates as an ex-
plicit barrier to commerce between two states.41 ' The state, according
to the Court, bears the initial burden of demonstrating a close fit be-
tween the reciprocity requirement and its asserted local purpose,412 and
the reciprocity requirement failed this initial hurdle."3 There was no
evidence that the reciprocal restriction was narrowly tailored to the
conservation and preservation rationale;4 4 therefore, the reciprocity
requirement did not survive the "strictest scrutiny" reserved for facially
discriminatory legislation.4"5 If it could be shown that the state as a
whole suffered a water shortage, that the intrastate transportation of
water from areas of abundance to areas of shortage was feasible
regardless of distance, and that the importation of water from adjoining
states would roughly compensate for any exportation to those states,
then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credibly ad-
vanced for the reciprocity provision. A demonstrably ard state con-
ceivably might be able to marshall evidence to establish a close means-
end relationship between even a total ban on the exportation of water
and a purpose to conserve and preserve water. Nebraska did not claim
such evidence existed.
On the third question presented by Sporhase's appeal, the Supreme
Court held Nebraska's contention that Congress had authorized states
to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in
groundwater not to be well-founded.416 Nebraska based its claim on
thirty-seven statutes in which Congress had deferred to state water law
and on a number of interstate compacts dealing with water that have
been approved by Congress. The Supreme Court stated:
408. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
409. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
410. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1973).
411. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982).
412. Id. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
413. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982).
414. Id.
415. Id. at 5120. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1929). See also supra text
accompanying note 396.
416. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982).
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Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate
Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that
Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on
such laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like
the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of
the valid state law to which Congress has deferred. Neither the
fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal water law
to govern water rights involved in federal projects nor the fact that
Congress has been willing to let the states settle their differences
over water rights through mutual agreement, constitutes persuasive
evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral imposition of
unreasonable burdens on commerce. In the instances in which we
have found such consent, Congress' intent and policy to sustain
state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause was ex-
pressly stated.17
Even though Sporhase v. Nebraska did not settle the constitutionality
question on antiexport statutes, the decision is instructive. Antiexport
statutes should be written carefully as conservation and preservation
measures that do not discriminate in favor of transfers for use within
the state. If out-of-state water transfers are restricted, then interbasin
transfers within the state should also be restricted. If water may not
be transported out of state in the form of coal slurry, then this pro-
hibition must also apply to in-state uses. Antiexport statutes may be
upheld as constitutional if they do not discriminate against out-of-state
users and a clear and demonstrable state purpose exists which only
incidentally interferes with interstate commerce. Similarly, such statutes
requiring specific legislative approval before an interstate transfer can
take place may be upheld if these conditions are met. Statutes allow-
ing the interstate movement of water upon reciprocal bases are more
likely to be struck down for violation of the commerce clause than
are direct prohibitions of the interstate movement as a burden to the
free flow of interstate commerce. Only state interests of substantial
importance could save such a statute.41 Further, statutes attempting
to compensate states for the depletion of a nonrenewable source of
groundwater may be valid under a recent Supreme Court ruling affir-
ming the constitutionality of Montana's coal severance tax."1 9
Professor Corker's comments on City of Altus v. Carr are likewise
instructive.4 20 Recognizing that the city had already spent considerable
417. Id. at 3466.
418. See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 336 (1976).
419. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
420. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
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money on the acquisition of land and water rights before the Texas
legislature enacted its antiexport statute, Corker, in discussing possi-
ble Idaho legislation, said:
Clearly I think, the Commerce Clause does not threaten the validity
of any state legislation limiting or forbidding export of water if
that legislation applies to future diversions and is wholly without
discrimination in favor of exports for use within Idaho. Interstate
"commerce" may or may not be involved, but if it is, non-
discriminatory legislation is likely to survive if it has a clear and
demonstrable relation to any state purpose-preserving Idaho rivers
for salmon, for recreationists, for irrigators or for cities wherever
located.42'
VIII. Constitutionality of Colorado's Antiexport Statutes
Colorado's two antiexport statutes relating to surface22 and ground423
waters, which purport to be conservation measures, must be analyzed
in light of Sporhase v. Nebraska421 to determine their constitutionality.
In addition, Colorado has another statute that prohibits the use of
water for transporting another substance outside the state unless such
diverted water is credited as a delivery to the other state by Colorado
under an existing interstate compact.2s Colorado's statutes creating
an absolute ban on interstate use of water are protectionist in nature,
favor intrastate uses, and discriminate against interstate commerce. For
example, the statutes do not prohibit the use of water for coal slurry
transportation intrastate, but do prevent water from crossing state lines
for interstate transportation of coal in slurry form.
The Colorado constitution expressly declares the waters of all natural
streams to be public property and dedicated to the use of the people,42
and states that the right to divert all unappropriated waters of a natural
stream shall never be denied.2 7 In Sporhase v. Nebraska state owner-
ship of water was rejected as grounds for removing water as an article
of commerce and thus exempting its interstate transfer from scrutiny
under the commerce clause.28 The Supreme Court stated that the public
421. Corker, supra note 321, at 148.
422. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
423. Id. § 37-90-136 (1973).
424. 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
425. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-103(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Water mixed with other substances
in the process of forming a slurry for the purpose of transporting any substance as a suspended
solid shall not be deemed to have lost its character as water. Id.
426. COLO. CONST. art. Xvi, § 5.
427. Id., art. XVI, § 6.
428. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3461 (1982).
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ownership theory was nothing "but a fiction expressive in legal short-
hand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve
and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.' 429
Although restrictions on the transfer of water out of state are ab-
solute, the law with respect to the transfer of water rights within Col-
orado is unusually lenient. There are virtually no restrictions on the
transfer of a water right with respect either to the type of use or the
place of use. 30 Colorado statutes permit water rights to be owned,
sold, leased, exchanged, loaned, or transferred."3 The point of diver-
sion may be changed as well as the manner of use, subject only to
the condition that the rights of other appropriators not be seriously
injured. 432 Intrastate and interbasin transfers of water are practiced
on a daily basis. The Colorado Supreme Court has approved these
transfers by stating in one case that "the constitution unquestionably
contemplates and sanctions the business of transporting water for hire
from natural streams to distant consumers,' 433 and in another case
that it found "nothing in the constitution which even intimates that
waters should be retained in the watershed where originating. '4 3 4 Col-
orado's law appears to treat water as a marketable commodity despite
the broad conservation declarations contained in the statutes. This coin-
cides with the holding in Sporhase v. Nebraska that water is an article
of commerce and subject to commerce clause inquiry.35
Even though groundwater has been declared an article of commerce
and as such subject to congressional regulation and control under the
commerce clause, it does not mean that Colorado's antiexport statutes
are invalid as being an unreasonable burden on and interfering with
interstate commerce. The commerce clause concerns three spheres of
commerce-channels (i.e., pipelines), articles (i.e., products that are
429. Id. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 402 (1948).
430. See Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 372-73, 237 P.2d 116,
120 (1951), where the court said:
It is elementary learning in Colorado that a water priority is a property right-not
a mere revocable privilege; that it is not a fixed appurtenance; that the right to
change its place of use and point of diversion is an inherent property right, not
conferred by our remedial statute, but pre-existing as an instrument of ownership,
and always enforceable so long as the vested rights of others are not injuriously
affected.
431. See CoLo. R.v. STAT. §§ 37-83-101, -105; 37-84-102 (1973).
432. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 105-06, 371 P.2d 775, 783 (1962). See supra
note 430.
433. Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co., 10 Colo. .582, 588, 17 P. 487, 490 (1887).
434. Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.,
148 Colo. 173, 202, 365 P.2d 273, 288-89 (1961).
435. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3463 (1982).
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moving directly in commerce), and instrumentalities (i.e., activities of
the state affecting the movement of articles of commerce).436 Whether
a state act or regulation interferes with commerce turns on the nature
and severity of the burden created and the local purpose served by
the act or regulation. If the act or regulation is protectionist in nature
and discriminates on its face or in its application, it will be held in-
valid. If the state act or regulation serves a legitimate local interest,
then the beneficial effect of the local interest is balanced against the
burdens the act or regulation imposes upon interstate commerce. State
acts will be upheld where they only incidentally burden or discriminate
against interstate commerce. However, state acts that are flagrantly
discriminatory or that impose burdens on commerce that are clearly
excessive in relation to the local benefits will be held invalid. Thus,
where a legitimate local concern is found, the test becomes one of degree
and depends upon the nature of the local interest involved and whether
it could be promoted equally.well through a lesser impact on interstate
activities. '
One will have to compare the Colorado and Nebraska groundwater
statutes governing both intrastate and interstate use of water in light
of Sporhase v. Nebraska. Nebraska's antiexport statute has four con-
ditions governing the issuance of a permit for withdrawing ground-
water for an interstate transfer and use. These requirements are that
the withdrawal of groundwater requested is reasonable, not contrary
to the conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimen-
tal to the public welfare, and that the state in which the water is to
be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transfer groundwater
from that state for use in Nebraska.3 ' The Supreme Court upheld the
first three conditions as advancing the state's interest in conservation
and preservation of its diminishing groundwater sources,39 but found
the reciprocity provision operated as an explicit barrier to commerce
436. Martz & Grazis, supra note 18, at 61. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 112 (1941).
437. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970);
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1950); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928). See Pike, supra at 142 which stated:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
putative local benefits.... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will
of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
438. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
439. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982).
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between states.40 Conserving and preserving a state's groundwater
sources is a legitimate and highly important purpose of a state statute,'4 4'
and looking at Nebraska's antiexport statute in relation to the state's
other groundwater regulations for intrastate use demonstrates the state's
genuine interest in conservation and preservation.4 2 Nebraska, which
imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens, is
not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to pre-
vent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of state. An exemption
for interstate transfers would be inconsistent with the ideal of
evenhandedness in regulation.443
Colorado's antiexport statutes 44 are like Nebraska's in that they pur-
port to conserve and preserve water, but unlike Nebraska's in that they
absolutely prohibit the out-of-state diversion of Colorado water. Like
Nebraska, Colorado does have a permit system for groundwater
withdrawal and statutes governing the intrastate use of groundwater.
4 45
Unlike Nebraska, which strictly limits' the intrastate transfer of
groundwater,46 Colorado has virtually no restrictions on the transfer
of water rights with respect to either type of use or place of use.47
The Colorado antiexport statutes appear to be discriminatory against
interstate commerce because different standards are applied to intrastate
and interstate transfers and use, in that there is an absolute prohibi-
tion against interstate diversion, while lenient rules are applicable to
intrastate transfers. Federal courts may support a state statute giving
a limited preference to its own citizens in the utilization of natural
resources, but the Colorado statutes give a total preference to its own
citizens.448 According to Sporhase v. Nebraska, Colorado would have
to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship be-
tween a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to con-
serve and preserve water.1
4 9
One factor that may work in favor of upholding the constitution-
ality of Colorado's antiexport groundwater statute is the location of
the wells from which San Marco Pipeline proposes to withdraw its water.
If the proposed well field is located in the nontributary bedrock aquifer
440. Id.
441. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188 (1950).
442. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3463 (1982).
443. Id.
444. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-81-101, 37-90-136 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
445. See id. §§ 37-90-107, -137.
446. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, (1982).
447. See notes 430 to 435 supra and accompanying text.
448. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978).
449. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982). The Court indicated that an arid
state could conceivably present such evidence.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
that is in a nondesignated groundwater basin, only that amount of
water underlying the land owned by the permit applicant or other owners
with their consent can be withdrawn. In addition, the useful life of
the aquifer must be at least 100 years and the withdrawal cannot in-
jure other vested water rights."0 Intrastate use of water from this source
is very restrictive; therefore, prohibition against interstate use of this
type of water may withstand a constitutional challenge of not being
discriminatory against interstate commerce. The state engineer thought
that San Marco Pipeline should have applied for its well construction
permit under the statutory section applicable to this type of ground-
water.45'
IX. Alternatives to Appropriating Water Under State Restrictions
Various alternatives might be considered by coal slurry pipeline com-
panies that find themselves prohibited by Colorado law from acquir-
ing water rights for interstate transfer of coal slurry. The possibilities
include federal eminent domain powers, leasing water from Indian reser-
vations, seeking to credit water to interstate compacts, and purchasing
federal storage water.
Federal Eminent Domain Powers for Slurry Pipelines
Several bills have been introduced in the Congress in the last few
years to encourage the construction of coal slurry pipelines and the
development of western coal reserves. Many of these bills sought to
authorize coal slurry pipeline companies to acquire rights-of-way by
exercising the federal power of eminent domain, but they specifically
stated that the companies must comply with state water laws. These
bills illustrate the federal government's reluctance to preempt or inter-
fere with states regulating water rights.
Eminent domain power is especially critical because railroads have
been uncooperative in giving rights-of-way to pipeline companies, thus
forcing the matter into litigation and as a result delaying, raising the
cost of, and in some cases .actually halting proposed construction of
coal slurry pipelines.45 Most of the bills so far introduced in Congress
give the Secretary of the Interior power to grant rights-of-way for coal
slurry pipelines across federal lands. A major problem with these bills,
450. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(4) (1973).
451. See notes 94 to 108 supra and accompanying text.
452. For another viewpoint, see Lang, The Case against Federal Eminent Domain Powers
for Slurry Pipelines, 110 PUB. UTni. FoRTmonrLY 23-26 (1982). Mr. Lang, vice president of
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and probably the central reason why no bill has yet been enacted into
law, is the potential effects these bills could have on western water
rights under state law.
H.R. 4370,453 introduced into the Congress in 1979, would allow
the Secretary of the Interior to certify coal slurry pipelines and grant
them the right of eminent domain. A provision was incorporated to
approve any state-imposed conditions or limitations on the use of water
for slurry:
The establishment of terms or conditions to effectuate a legitimate
State public interest pursuant o State law. .. shall not be deemed
to prevent, unreasonably burden, discriminate against, or directly
negate interstate commerce even though in the absence of this Act,
such State law or laws or the establishment, exercise or enforce-
ment of such terms and conditions may be deemed violative of
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution .4
Such a constitutional interpretation by Congress is not binding; however,
in the event that such a provision is enacted into law, it should operate
as an effective delegation of congressional power to the states to regulate
interstate commerce as it pertains to water.4"
H.R. 1374,' 56 introduced in 1981, also stressed state control over
water use. The bill would prohibit the granting of a right-of-way under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19764 7 for a coal
slurry pipeline using groundwater in connection with such transpor-
tation unless each affected state consented to that use.58
Federal legislation could be adopted to authorize coal slurry pipeline
companies to acquire water rights by eminent domain powers. There
is ample precedent for the exercise of such powers by federal agencies
and instrumentalities,' 59 even against conflicting state and local interests
and policies,46 and for the delegation of such powers to private
entities,461 wherever the exercise thereof is necessary and proper for
the enjoyment of one of the enumerated powers vested in the federal
government by the United States Constitution.4 62 The character of the
453. H.R. 4370, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
454. Id. § 302(c)(2).
455. Webber, supra note 22, at 783.
456. H.R. 1374, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
457. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
458. H.R. 1374, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1981).
459. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1875).
460. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
461. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 530 (1894); California v. Central Pacific
R.R., 127 U.S. 1, 39, (1888). See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1976); National Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1976) (statutory delegations of eminent domain authority).
462. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242-43 (1946).
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property interest in the water, however, creates difficulties in using
federal eminent domain powers to solve water supply problems. The
property interest does not inhere in a tangible physical commodity,
but in an intangible privilege, shaped by local custom and policies of
state law; it affords the appropriator the right to divert a quantity of
water in priority and to apply the same to a beneficial use, but subject
to various conditions of the state constitution and laws, including in
some cases a restriction upon the use of water outside the state. The
condemning authority may be privileged to condemn property and prop-
erty rights and acquire whatever interest the condemnee has in it; it
may not be privileged, however, to create a new property interest with
rights and privileges in excess of those theretofore existing. Yet it would
have to do essentially that if the condemnation were to free the water
rights from the limitations of state law.4"3
Federal Reserved Water Rights
State water law is irrelevant under the doctrine of federal reserved
water rights because the federal government would be making its own
water available for coal slurry pipelines.4" The federal reserved water
rights doctrine, commonly known as the Winters doctrine or the doctrine
of implied reservation-of-water rights, was judicially created by the
Supreme Court in Winters v. United States."65 The doctrine of implied
reservation-of-water rights states that when the federal government made
a reservation or withdrawal of land, it also impliedly reserved suffi-
cient water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. The quantities of
water reserved include amounts necessary for future as well as present
needs of the reservation. The government's water right is not depen-
dent upon the application of the water to any beneficial use, nor is
it perfected through nonuse. The right has a priority date as of the
time the reservation was originally withdrawn. It is junior only to those
private appropriations dated prior to the reservation's withdrawal.466
Reserved water rights are appli6able to federal reserved lands, such
463. Martz & Grazis, supra note 18, at 65-66. See id. at 66-67 for further discussion of the
problems with using eminent domain powers.
464. See Tarlock, supra note 72, at 530-38; Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 449-89;
Boles & Elliott, supra note 322, at 209-35 for discussion of federal reserved water rights doctrine.
465. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The federal government brought suit on behalf of the Indians on
the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana to enjoin upstream farmers from diverting
water from the Milk River for irrigation. !d. at 565.
466. Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 450. See Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and
How it Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, I B.Y.U.L. REv. 639 (1975)
for a comprehensive review of the doctrine and its history.
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as national forests and parks, wildlife refuges, national recreation areas,
and Indian reservations.67
The Supreme Court in Winters held that the waters of the Milk River,
arising on, flowing through, or bordering the Fort Belknap Indian Reser-
vation, were impliedly reserved for the Indians as of the date the reser-
vation was created.68 The right to future use of the water was vested
in the Indians even though the right was presently not exercised. Under
this doctrine Indian reserved rights cannot be forfeited by nonuse or
by state action through condemnation, inverse condemnation, or
statute.4 69 The federal government is obligated, as trustee of the In-
dian reserved water rights, to protect and enforce those rights.70 In
1963 the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California4 7' affirmed the doctrine
of Indian reserved rights and held that the reservation included suffi-
cient quantities of water to satisfy present and future needs of the In-
dian reservation.7
The quantity of water reserved under the doctrine of implied-
reservation-of-water rights is elusive.73 No standard has yet been univer-
sally accepted, although numerous cases are pending on this precise
issue.74 Several methods have been advanced for quantifying reserved
water rights. The open-ended method, favored by the Indians, would
allow them to use as much water as they would ultimately need in
the future for any use, that is, the method permits extension of the
right to the ultimate need of the tribe.47" A second method is more
limited and permanently quantifies rights according to the reasonable
foreseeable Indian needs and uses.76 Many Indian reservations include
467. Federal reserved lands are distinguised from other public domain lands. Federal reserved
lands are those enclaves that are withdrawn from the public domain for a specified purpose,
such as a national park or forest. "Public lands" are the remainder of the lands owned by
the United States, which are subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land
laws. The doctrine has not been applied to these public lands.
468. Winters v. UnitedStates, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). The Court noted the policy of
the government and desire of the Indians that the Indians change their nomadic habits and develop
an agrarian society. Id. at 576. Because portions of the reserved land were dry and arid, large
quantities of water would be required for irrigation to make the lands productive. Id. at 566.
469. See Ranquist, supra note 466, at 655.
470. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-58 (D.D.C.
1973).
471. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
472. Id. at 600. The Court asserted that the doctrine was also applicable to other federal reser-
vations, such as national parks, forests, recreation areas, and military installations. Id. at 601.
473. Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 461.
474. Id. at 478-79, 479 n.151.
475, Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1908).
476. Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968). This method requires
a need and use prerequisite.
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vast reserves of coal and much water is needed for its development,
so under this theory, the Indians could claim a need for extensive water
rights.'7" A third method, and the most widely accepted, is to quantify
Indian reserved water rights according to the irrigable acreage on the
reservation land."'
How might the doctrine of federal reserved water rights affect coal
slurry pipelines? Indian tribes may be interested in leasing their water
rights. The Black Mesa Pipeline, for example, utilizes water leased from
the Navajo and Hopi Indian reservations in northeast Arizona.'79 The
leases permit the Peabody Coal Company to draw groundwater from
deep aquifers. Under the terms of the lease, Peabody pays a fixed price
for each acre-foot of water withdrawn, but such withdrawals may not
impair the two tribes' underground water supply. If impairment does
result, Peabody must furnish replacement water. Peabody's leases are
subject to periodic renegotiation. Because other profitable uses for this
water have arisen, it is not unlikely that at renegotiation the tribal
representatives will insist on higher water prices, or that they may now
be completely opposed to continued exportation of water from the reser-
vations. Even with long-term leases, the possibility of changing tribal
attitudes limits the attractiveness of relying on Indian reserved rights
as an exclusive source of slurry water.
Credit Slurry Water to Interstate Compacts
Crediting water to an interstate compact is the only way permitted
by statute of exporting water from Colorado.8 ' Both surface and
tributary groundwater used in a coal slurry pipeline destined for Tekas
could theoretically be credited to Texas through the Rio Grande
Compact.8' That compact was agreed to and approved by Congress
in 1939 in order to equitably apportion the water of the Rio Grande
River among Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico.
New Mexico and Texas sued Colorado in a 1968. original action in
the United States Supreme Court alleging that Colorado had delivered
a million acre-feet of water less than provided for by the Rio Grande
Compact and asked that Colorado be forced to comply with the com-
pact and repay the alleged "debit" of water. The Supreme Court granted
a continuance of the case upon the stipulation of the three parties.
The agreement provided that there would be no prosecution for the
477. See Drawing Battle Lines, supra note 112, at 468.
478. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963).
479. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
480. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-81-103 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
481. See id. § 37-66-101 (1973).
[Vol. 36:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/28
19831 INTERSTATE TRANSFER OF COLORADO WATER 61
claim for payment of the water debit as long as Colorado undertook
to meet the delivery obligation established by the schedules of the com-
pact on an annual basis. '82 As a result, the Colorado state engineer
proposed rules and regulations to enable Colorado to meet its com-
pact requirements."83 Delivery of certain quantities of water pursuant
to the compact became the most senior water commitment as to sur-
face and tributary groundwater in the Rio Grande and Conejos river
systems. Thus, all surface and ground water diversions by state water
rights holders are subject to regulation to the extent necessary to deliver
the amount of water required pursuant to compact terms.
8 "
Colorado cannot provide more water to Texas than the amount the
compact allows without further harming the holders of already cur-
tailed water rights. ' Crediting coal slurry water transported to Texas
to the compact may relieve some burden on these Colorado rights.
A Texas agreement to accept some of its water entitled to under the
compact as slurry water, however, would depend on its water laws and
the demands of its water permit holders. It seems unlikely that Texas
would be politically able to accept some of the Colorado water it is
entitled to under the compact in the form of slurry water because of
the consequent reduction in its existing water rights. Coal slurry-pipelines
will need much greater support at the state level to enable pipeline
advocates to take advantage of compact rights.
Use of Federal Storage Water
Federal multipurpose storage reservoirs could become an important
source of water for energy development. The authority for selling surplus
storage water for energy projects, however, is not very clear. The Bureau
of Reclamation has general statutory authority to sell surplus water,
but such a sale may have to conform with the primary purpose of
the individual reservoir project involved.8 6
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus,"87 a federal court
determined that the Flood Control Act of 1944 authorized industrial
use of project water.4 88 The court held that the Secretary of the In-
482. In re Rules & Regulations Governing Water Rights, 196 Colo. 197, 583 P.2d 910, 911-12
(1978).
483. Id., 583 P.2d at 911.
484. Id., 583 P.2d at 912.
485. See notes 76 to 93 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the water shortages
in the Rio Grande Basin and Colorado's obligation under the Rio Grande River Compact.
486. See Tarlock, supra note 72, at 547.
487. 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1979).
488. See 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976).
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terior has authority to sell water for industrial use only if it will not
impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation projects."8 9 In the
Andrus opinion, the court explained the water marketing program begun
in 1967 by the Secretary of the Interior. Under the program, water
option contracts could be granted for a period of up to forty years,
but preference is given to municipalities and other public corporations.
These contracts may be subject to various conditions, and the case
held that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be prepared
and approved before any contract could be granted.4 9 Although a
federal option contract may be burdened with certain conditions, such
as an EIS or conformance with any applicable federal water conserva-
tion requirements, it may still be a good source of reliable long-term
water supply for coal slurry pipelines.4 '
Summary and Conclusions
Coal slurry pipelines would increase the demand for water in the
semiarid western states where a large percentage of the country's coal
reserves are located. Several pipelines are in varying stages of planning
and development, but are awaiting water allocation and/or easements
before construction can begin. Pipeline advocates contend that tremen-
dous cost savings will result from pipeline operations, that water need-
ed for pipelines is only a small amount in comparison with the total
consumption of water for other uses, that pipelines are relatively water
efficient when compared to the use of water in generating electricity
with coal, and that pipelines will have a lesser impact on the environ-
ment than other forms of coal transportation. Opponents of coal slurry
pipelines contend that they will have a severe economic impact on
railroads, that they consume too much water from the semiarid western
states where water is a valuable and scarce resource, and that pipelines
will create water-quality problems.
The San Marco Pipeline Company has proposed a 1,000-mile pipeline
system to move approximately 15 million tons of coal a year, along
with 15,000 acre-feet of water, from Walsenberg in southeastern Col-
orado to several generating facilities in Houston and the Texas Gulf
Coast area. The Rio Grande Basin, source of the coal and the proposed
water for the pipeline, has severe water supply problems caused by
the low levels of precipitation, the high agricultural demand for irriga-
489. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1979).
490. Id. at 851-53.
491. See Tarlock, supra note 72, at 545 for further discussion of the use of water from federal
storage for coal slurry pipelines.
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tion, and the water delivery requirements of the Rio Grande River
Compact.
San Marco Pipeline Company has been unable to obtain state per-
mits for its required water allotment. It applied to the Colorado state
engineer in June 1976 under a statute applicable to areas outside the
boundaries of a designated groundwater basin for permits to construct
wells that would appropriate up to 15,000 acre-feet of groundwater
from a well field in Costilla County. The state engineer denied the
permit application, citing Colorado's antiexport statute prohibiting the
export of groundwater out of state and claiming that the company failed
to specify the particular designated aquifer from which the water was
to be diverted. San Marco filed an application with the water court
for an adjudication of conditional underground water rights in the
aquifer underlying the well field, and the case is still pending.
Colorado has established a comprehensive system for water rights
administration. Within the statutory guidelines, water appropriators
have great freedom to use or market their water rights for in-state
beneficial uses. Water is freely transported from basin to basin within
the state, and even though water conservation is mentioned in the
statute, it is not vigorously pursued. Water appropriators are real prop-
erty owners and their water rights are protected from impairment by
the state or by junior water-rights holders.
Colorado's antiexport statutes prohibiting the diversion of the state's
surface and groundwater for use out of state, unless credited to an
interstate compact, seems to be out of spirit with the state's statutes
governing interbasin transfers within the state. If a water appropriator
has the right to use water beneficially within the state, some have ques-
tioned why the user is restricted to in-state uses. Is this mere hoarding
of a natural resource in violation of the commerce clause in the United
States Constitution, or is water of such a different inherent character
that states can restrict interstate transfers and protect their supplies?
Water is a unique resource and is vital to all of society's activities.
Water has now been ruled an article of commerce or a commodity
and as such subject to commerce clause restrictions. State ownership
of a natural resource, such as water, does not exempt it from com-
merce clause scrutiny.
The controversy over whether antiexport statutes are constitutional
under the commerce clause remains unresolved and depends upon the
nature of restrictions and affected rights. Coal slurry pipeline com-
panies have only two choices for pursuing water rights within Colorado.
They may challenge the validity of the antiexport statutes on commerce
clause grounds, or they may attempt to use alternatives rather than
to appropriate water under state restrictions. Alternatives include gaining
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federal eminent domain powers for rights-of-way, using federal reserved
water rights, crediting the slurry water to interstate compacts, and using
federal storage water.
Colorado's antiexport statutes appear to be discriminatory against
out-of-state transfers and use; therefore, in a commerce clause challenge
these statutes may be held invalid primarily because of the state's
leniency toward intrastate transfers. Whether a state statute interferes
with commerce turns on the nature and severity of the burden created
and the local purpose served by the statute. State statutes will be upheld
only where they incidentally burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce. States may impose severe restrictions on diverting water
for out-of-state uses provided the same type of conservation measures
are imposed on in-state uses. A court may find that the Colorado anti-
export statutes are discriminatory against out-of-state users because of
the different requirements imposed on out-of-state and in-state uses.
Colorado may want to consider restructuring its statutes to be fairer
to out-of-state users. Because there is not enough water to meet all
of the demands for its use, Colorado may want to set forth specific
priorities regarding beneficial use and water conservation. This was
done when the Colorado constitution was first written, but these consti-
tutional priorities were held applicable only for eminent domain pur-
poses. A tightly drawn, nondiscriminatory statute directing priorities
first to the most essential uses of water, as the state perceives them,
should tie state water policy closely to a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power. Such priorities need not alter the existing system and
could encompass current practices. They could be made to apply to
future appropriations and to appropriations seeking a change of
beneficial use determination. The latter provision would be the key
factor to implementing the use priorities as determined by state residents.
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